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I.  SYMBOLS IN LAW AND SOCIETY 
Institutions, as intermediaries between a society and individuals, serve as the 
vehicles through which social life is conducted, and they are therefore integral to the 
development and operation of every society.1  Indeed, institutions are the basic 
components of a society.2  Moreover, because a society is a system, each institution 
can affect and be affected by every other institution.  Law, the family, and religion 
are institutions, for example, and able to influence one another. 
To function smoothly, a society must, of course, be comprised of institutions that 
contribute to it in positive ways.  These contributions occur to the extent that 
institutions fulfill the recognized needs and embody the paramount values of their 
                                                                
*Professor, School of Law, Widener University, Wilmington, Delaware.  Postal address:  
Post Office Box 7474, Wilmington, DE 19803-0474 USA.  E-mail address:  
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Copyright © 2007 by Larry D. Barnett.  All rights reserved. 
The Widener University Legal Information Center provided invaluable assistance in the 
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Mallonee, Kelly Pierce, and Sandra Sadow of the Center staff. 
1Donald N. Levine, Introduction, in GEORG SIMMEL: ON INDIVIDUALITY AND SOCIAL 
FORMS: SELECTED WRITINGS xv-xvii, xxvi (Donald N. Levine ed. 1971). 
2In this article, the word “institution” refers to a general pattern of interpersonal behavior 
that exists in a society and that is central to the operation of the society.  An institution is thus 
“an established . . . custom, usage, practice . . . or other element in the political or social life of 
a people; a regulative principle or convention subservient to the needs of an organized 
community or the general ends of civilization.”  7 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 1047 (2nd ed. 
1989). 
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society.  Indeed, if an institution does not aid the operation of the system in which it 
exists, the institution will change so that its doctrines and practices do so.  
Sociological imperatives, not individual personalities, ultimately mold the character 
of institutions.3 
Unfortunately, the preceding principles of macrosociology seem rarely to be the 
concern of research on the institution of law.  With few exceptions, scholarship in 
law simply takes for granted the institutional character of law, and the societal 
foundation of the institution is, therefore, generally ignored.  However, law must be 
understood in its societal context, for law would not be an institution unless it was a 
sociological necessity.  Law, that is, does something for society that is vital.  But 
what?  The answer, in part, seems to be that law allows each participant in a potential 
interpersonal relationship to expect certain behavior from the other participant(s).4  
This function is important sociologically because reliance on expectations of others’ 
behavior is at the foundation of interpersonal relationships, and the fulfillment of 
such expectations is necessary for a viable social order.  But while law helps to make 
possible interpersonal relationships and hence a social system,5 how it performs this 
function has yet to be established.  The particular mechanisms involved, and the 
exact role and relative importance of each mechanism, have not been widely agreed 
upon by social scientists and scholars who study law. 
The present article focuses on one mechanism that has been of interest to 
researchers—viz., symbols.  Students of the institution of law have long contended 
that law has a symbolic character6 and that the symbols of the institution can 
strengthen the fabric of social life and promote the cohesion of society.7  Although a 
social system will, over time, change its specific symbols of law and the prominence 
given to such symbols generally, law-related symbols may be attracting more 
attention from the average American now than in the past.  Indeed, one scholar has 
suggested that a central characteristic of the United States is “the development of 
public reverence for the symbols of law.”8 
While the particular symbols of law in a society may shift over time and may be 
less important at some points in history than at others, symbols of law are probably 
never completely absent from a society and never completely unimportant.  Societies 
uniformly seem to develop and use symbols9 because “[s]ymbols help citizens 
organize their beliefs, reinforce core values, and provide a rallying point for those 
                                                                
3LARRY D. BARNETT, LEGAL CONSTRUCT, SOCIAL CONCEPT 14-19 (1993). 
4Larry D. Barnett, Social Productivity, Law, and the Regulation of Conflicts of Interest in 
the Investment Industry, 3 CARDOZO PUB. L., POL’Y & ETHICS J. 793, 794-95 (2006). 
5Street v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 645 F.2d 1227, 1237 (6th Cir. 1981) (stating that “[s]ocial 
order is based on law, . . . .”). 
6E.g., THURMAN W. ARNOLD, THE SYMBOLS OF GOVERNMENT (1935). 
7E.g., John W. Ragsdale, Jr., Anasazi Jurisprudence, 22 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 393, 423 
(1998). 
8Christopher E. Smith, Imagery, Politics, and Jury Reform, 28 AKRON L. REV. 77, 78-79 
(1994). 
9KAREN A. CERULO, IDENTITY DESIGNS: THE SIGHTS AND SOUNDS OF A NATION 12 (1995). 
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who believe in them, thus reducing the costs of organization.”10  Symbols from the 
institution of law seem to be beneficial, and are probably indispensable, for 
sustaining a social system.  The societal importance of symbols of law is indicated 
by the diversity of these symbols,11 which include far more than the well-known 
blindfolded female figure holding balanced scales and a sword.12  Indeed, a symbol 
of the institution of law may be drawn from another institution in the society,13 and 
under certain conditions, a symbol of the institution may be an individual who has 
intentionally violated a statute and committed a felony.14 
The present article focuses on symbolic concepts and doctrines in statutes and  in 
court rules and opinions.15  Symbolism has been noted in statutes that define 
behavior as criminal;16 in legislation that recognizes marriage and specifies the sex 
composition of the married couple;17 and in the Securities Act of 1933,18 the original 
(and still a fundamental) federal statute dealing with securities.19  Accordingly, it is 
logical to assume that there is symbolism in the concepts and doctrines of other 
statutes and in the concepts and doctrines of rules adopted by regulatory bodies.  Part 
III of this article illustrates the assumption with the federal Investment Advisers 
Act.20  Part IV pursues the assumption further with a very different subject, namely, 
the appearance-of-impropriety standard for assessing attorney behavior.  
Specifically, Part IV employs the standard in an attempt to isolate some of the 
                                                                
10Steven G. Calabresi, Federalism and the Rehnquist Court: A Normative Defense, 574 
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 24, 34 (2001). 
11Barnett, supra note 4, at 821-24. 
12E.g., Glover v. State, 386 S.E.2d 699, 702 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989) (Benham, J., concurring). 
13Sally Engle Merry, Legal Pluralism, 22 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 869, 882 (1988). 
14Paul Kooistra, Criminals as Heroes: Linking Symbol to Structure, 13 SYMBOLIC 
INTERACTION 217 (1990). 
15Concepts and doctrines in the Constitution of the United States, and in court decisions 
interpreting the Constitution, can also be symbols.  Calabresi, supra note 10, at 34; see Gene 
R. Nichol, Toward a People's Constitution, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 621, 621 (2003) (book review) 
(“The Constitution is not quite as potent a symbol to us as the flag, but it occupies a close 
second.”).  Indeed, since the Constitution is the charter of the nation as a sovereign entity, the 
clauses in it that express cultural ideals are inescapably symbolic, and the document as a 
whole is, too.  Max Lerner, Constitution and Court as Symbols, 46 YALE L. J. 1290, 1299-
1300 (1937); see Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 523 (1950). 
16E.g., V. F. Nourse, Twenty-five Years of George P. Fletcher’s Rethinking Criminal Law:  
Rethinking Crime Legislation: History and Harshness, 39 TULSA L. REV. 925, 934 (2004) 
(“[C]rime legislation is a powerful symbol of public and political order and stability.”). 
17Kathleen E. Hull, The Cultural Power of Law and the Cultural Enactment of Legality: 
The Case of Same-Sex Marriage, 28 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 629, 638 (2003). 
18Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77z-3 (1997 & Supp. 2005). 
19Roberta S. Karmel, Realizing the Dream of William O. Douglas—The Securities and 
Exchange Commission Takes Charge of Corporate Governance, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 79, 142 
(2005). 
20Investment Advisers Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1- 80b –21 (2000 & Supp. II 2002). 
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societal conditions that contribute to symbolism in the doctrines of law.  The attempt 
will advance the understanding of law provided by the discipline of sociology, which 
rests on the assumption that the properties of a society have broad effects on the 
institutions of the society. 
Unfortunately, while scholars trained in the discipline of law have understood 
that law has a symbolic nature, they have not undertaken, or joined with sociologists 
in undertaking, rigorous quantitative research on the circumstances in which, the 
variations in the degree to which, and the paths by which law as symbol affects and 
is affected by the social order.  These questions must be answered, however, if a 
useful body of knowledge is to be developed on law as an institution.  Key questions 
regarding law that involves symbolism, therefore, have not been studied with the 
research tools offering the greatest power and precision.  The situation exists partly 
because few scholars trained in law appreciate that numeric information can be used 
to investigate the questions and that quantitative data can be analyzed with statistical 
techniques to obtain estimates of the answers to the questions.21  The situation is 
probably compounded by a resistance on the part of law school faculty-scholars to 
acknowledging that the content of law is closely tied to—indeed, that the content of 
law directly results from—the character of the society in which law is embedded.22  
Nonetheless, well-designed research on questions of law and symbolism is missing 
not just from the professional output of law-trained scholars.  Even sociologists, 
many of whom are highly skilled in measurement and data analysis, have undertaken 
few quantitative studies of symbols relevant to law and of the role of these symbols 
in social life.23  The situation in sociology is notable given the existence in the 
discipline of a school whose very name—symbolic interaction—directs attention to 
symbols.24  The rudimentary state of present knowledge regarding symbols in law 
and society thus cannot be explained solely by the work of scholars educated in law, 
but is attributable also to researchers educated in sociology. 
Because symbols are central to this article, their defining characteristics need to 
be identified.  In doing so, the concept of “symbol” must be juxtaposed with the 
concept of “sign,” and the similarities as well as the differences between symbols 
                                                                
21Douglas W. Vick, Interdisciplinarity and the Discipline of Law, 31 J.L. & SOC’Y 163, 
185, 192 (2004).  Moreover, scholars in the field of law who conduct empirical studies 
typically do so without employing the rules of scientific inference.  Lee Epstein & Gary King, 
Empirical Research and the Goals of Legal Scholarship: The Rules of Inference, 69 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1, 6 (2002). Therefore, these studies supply “considerably less accurate information 
about the empirical world than the studies’ stridently stated, but overly confident, conclusions 
suggest.”  Id. at 6-7. 
22Edward L. Rubin, Social Movements and Law Reform:  Passing Through the Door: 
Social Movement Literature and Legal Scholarship, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 78-80 (2001). 
23The studies that have been conducted are:  CERULO, supra note 9; Karen A. Cerulo, 
Sociopolitical Control and the Structure of National Symbols: An Empirical Analysis of 
National Anthems, 68 SOC. FORCES 76 (1989); Lauren B. Edelman, Legal Ambiguity and 
Symbolic Structures: Organizational Mediation of Civil Rights Law, 97 AM. J. SOC. 1531 
(1992). 
24Cf. Fred Davis, On the ‘Symbolic’ in Symbolic Interaction, 5 SYMBOLIC INTERACTION 
111 (1982) (contending that symbolic interaction as an approach has focused on interaction 
and ignored symbols). 
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and signs must be identified.  In terms of similarities, neither symbols nor signs on 
their own have intrinsic meanings.  Instead, symbols and signs represent other things, 
which may be tangible or intangible, and they produce responses because their 
referents have been learned.  Symbols and signs, consequently, are alike in the 
societal function they perform—each transmits meaning and, in doing so, is integral 
to the development and operation of societies.25  Without symbols and signs, a 
society is probably incapable of having an economy of even modest complexity, a 
population of even modest size, or technology of even modest sophistication. 
What distinguishes symbols from signs?  Collectively, signs form a, or the, 
language employed in a society,26 i.e., the signs in a group are the vehicles that make 
possible mutual understanding and interpersonal coordination.27  To be effective in a 
language, of course, a sign (which can be verbal or nonverbal) must have a specific 
referent; a sign whose meaning is ambiguous impedes rather than facilitates social 
interaction.  A symbol, on the other hand, possesses meanings that are of greater 
complexity.  Thus, a symbol communicates a message in the society using the 
symbol that is broader and more complicated than the message communicated by a 
sign.  Moreover, a symbol is more likely than a sign to have an impact on individuals 
that is emotional in nature28 and that, for neurological reasons, occurs partly at a 
subconscious level.29  For instance, the word “flag” is a sign whose referent is 
immediately intelligible and readily explained, but a flag in cloth or other tangible 
form is a symbol with a complex meaning that is, by comparison to its sign, less 
easily comprehended through oral or written descriptions.30  The importance to a 
group of the referent of a symbol, furthermore, confers importance on the symbol; 
thus, the cloth flag of a nation is socially significant in its own right as a symbol of 
the nation.31 
                                                                
25See Benjamin Lee Whorf, The Relation of Habitual Thought and Behavior to Language, 
in LANGUAGE, CULTURE, AND PERSONALITY: ESSAYS IN MEMORY OF EDWARD SAPIR 75 (Leslie 
Spier ed., 1941), reprinted in LANGUAGE, THOUGHT, AND REALITY: SELECTED WRITINGS OF 
BENJAMIN LEE WHORF 134, 154, 156, 159 (John B. Carroll ed., 1956); INO ROSSI, FROM THE 
SOCIOLOGY OF SYMBOLS TO THE SOCIOLOGY OF SIGNS 23, 52-53 (1983). 
26ROBERTA KEVELSON, THE LAW AS A SYSTEM OF SIGNS 4 (1988). 
27GARTH GILLAN, FROM SIGN TO SYMBOL 7 (1982). 
28Ute Krudewagen, Political Symbols in Two Constitutional Orders: The Flag 
Desecration Decisions of the United States Supreme Court and the German Federal 
Constitutional Court, 19 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 679, 679, 681-683 (2002). 
29David D. Franks, Mutual Interests, Different Lenses: Current Neuroscience and 
Symbolic Interaction, 26 SYMBOLIC INTERACTION 613 (2003). 
30See J. STEVEN OTT, THE ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE PERSPECTIVE 21-22 (1989). 
31For this reason, statutes have prohibited intentional damage to tangible forms of the 
national flag of the United States.  As applied to individuals who have deliberately damaged 
U.S. flags that they owned and who did so for the purpose of communicating a political 
message, the statutes have been judicially invalidated under the First Amendment to the 
Constitution.  United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 313, 315-316 (1990).  However, First 
Amendment case law does not deny the meaning attached to physical forms of the flag; rather, 
case law is an indicator of the greater weight placed by society on the cultural value(s) 
protected by the Amendment. 
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The preceding explanation of the nature of symbols may be aided by a dictionary 
definition of the word “symbol.”  Although dictionaries vary in the way they define 
the word, an illuminating definition depicts a symbol as: 
5. an object or act that represents a repressed complex through 
unconscious association rather than through objective resemblance or 
conscious substitution[;]  6. an act, sound, or material object having 
cultural significance and the capacity to excite or objectify a response. 32 
A symbol, then, carries a broad, intricate meaning in standing for something else 
and is visible, audible, and/or touchable.  A visible, touchable symbol includes the 
fabric flag of a country and a metal or wood religious artifact such as the Latin cross.  
An audible symbol is exemplified by a musical composition that has been formally 
adopted by a government as the official anthem of the country—the “Star Spangled 
Banner” in the case of the United States33—or that is closely but informally 
identified with the country, e.g., the song “God Bless America” by the composer 
Irving Berlin.  However, an item cannot be a symbol for a group unless the 
participants in the group recognize the referent(s) of the item.  That is, a particular 
item is symbolic only if the meaning of the item is apprehended.  The intention of the 
producer of the item is insufficient by itself to make the item a symbol. 
What is the function of symbols for society?34  Macrosociology defines a society 
as a human group that operates through and is maintained by institutions.  
Consequently, if an institution begins to damage its society, the institution will 
change—although possibly with a substantial time lag—so that it ceases to do so 
and, instead, supports the social order.35  Thus, as an institution, law in all of its 
forms—including statutes, administrative agency and court rules, and court 
decisions—manifests the acknowledged needs36 and represents the prevailing values 
of society, and in the long run, the concepts and doctrines of law act as the 
sociological equivalent of a magnet, attracting participants to their society rather than 
driving them away.  Law promotes the overall functioning of society by, in part, 
supplying symbols that solidify social life,37 and because law as an institution must 
                                                                
32WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2316 (unabridged ed. 1993). 
3336 U.S.C. § 301 (2000). 
34To the extent that symbols perform the function subtly—which may happen often—
measurement of the function is difficult. 
35See Larry D. Barnett, When Is a Mutual Fund Director Independent?  The Unexplored 
Role of Professional Relationships Under Section 2(a)(19) of the Investment Company Act, 4 
DEPAUL BUS. & COMM. L. J. 155, 155-160 (2006). 
36A societal need is any condition that is required for a society to be workable and that 
results in institutional change.  The concept of “societal need” is discussed in Larry D. Barnett, 
The Roots of Law, 15 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 613, 672-77 (2007). 
37Three justices of the United States Supreme Court recognized the symbolic aspect of 
law, but seem to have underestimated its societal importance, when they wrote:  “We cannot 
ignore that rules of law also have a symbolic power that may vastly exceed their utility.”  New 
Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 373 (1985) (Stevens, Marshall, and Brennan, JJ., dissenting).  
For the social system, however, the utility of law stems partially from the symbols generated 
by law.  Furthermore, in some situations, the utility of the symbolic aspect of law probably 
equals or surpasses other benefits to society furnished by the institution of law.  Law, for 
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not weaken the bond between a social system and its participants,38 the symbols of 
law will change as large-scale forces alter the properties of society. 
But how do we know when law is operating as a symbol?  Otherwise expressed, 
by what observable measure(s) can we determine whether a particular concept or 
doctrine is a symbol?  Unless the question is answered, quantitative research cannot 
be undertaken on the societal role of symbols of law, for such research requires that 
the presence—and, when appropriate, the magnitude—of every relevant variable be 
accurately identified.  Whether a particular concept or doctrine of law is a symbol or 
is not a symbol involves a variable, because there are two mutually exclusive states 
one of which logically must exist.  Moreover, for law that has become a symbol, the 
strength or importance of the symbol is a variable because strength/importance, by 
definition, is characterized by gradations; strength/importance can differ between 
symbols at any given point in time and can differ over time for any particular 
symbol.  Consequently, the symbolic aspect of law unavoidably involves at least one 
variable—viz., whether or not law is a symbol—and law that is a symbol will 
involve a second variable— viz., the intensity or salience of the symbol. 
The concern of this article is with the first variable: How can an investigator 
decide when a given concept or doctrine of law is a symbol?  The decision can 
probably be made using a number of alternative criteria, and given the limited state 
of social science knowledge regarding symbols, it would be presumptuous to believe 
that the criteria can be definitively and exhaustively listed at this time.  Nonetheless, 
one criterion can be suggested. 
II.  APPEARANCES AND SYMBOLISM IN LAW 
Social science research will someday determine whether the comment that “[t]he 
world is governed more by appearances than realities”39 is correct and whether the 
characterization of the 1980s and 1990s as “an Age of Appearances” in the United 
States40 is apt.  Should these claims be proven wrong, however, they are likely to 
have erred merely in degree.  If most of social life is not influenced by appearances, 
much undoubtedly is. 
How do appearances achieve such influence?  A social order, by definition, 
requires predictability in the behavior of individuals and groups, and even in groups 
with relatively few members, differentiated statuses and roles evidently emerge.41  
The attributes of individuals and groups, consequently, are important in social life.  
However, attributes can be socially relevant only when they are perceived, and 
perception unavoidably entails interpretation.  Indeed, the inherent character of 
                                                          
example, furnishes a social system with symbols that express cultural ideals, and these 
symbols, “by creating a realm . . . where all our dreams of justice in an unjust world come 
true,” in the long run promote the equilibrium of the system.  Arnold, supra note 6, at 34-35. 
38See CERULO, supra note 9, at 120-121, 164, 168. 
39Daniel Webster, quoted in MICHAEL MONCUR’S (CYNICAL) QUOTATIONS, The Quotations 
Page, http://www.quotationspage.com (last visited Nov. 7, 2006). 
40PETER W. MORGAN & GLENN H. REYNOLDS, THE APPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETY 2 (1997). 
41See John M. Levine & Richard L. Moreland, Small Groups, in 2 THE HANDBOOK OF 
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 415, 425-427 (Daniel T. Gilbert et al. eds., 4th ed. 1998) [hereinafter 
HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY]. 
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attributes may be less significant to a society than the perception and interpretation 
of the attributes.  Research has found that the manner in which the attributes of 
individuals and groups are perceived, as well as the context in which they are 
perceived, affects the treatment of and responses to the individuals and groups 
involved.42  In short, appearances—“the action or state of appearing or seeming to be 
(to eyes or mind); semblance; looking like”43—are an inherent and unavoidable 
aspect of life in a society.44 
Two illustrations may help at this point.  First, almost all parents give each of 
their children a name that their culture associates with the biological sex of the 
child.45  Sociologically, the name of an individual is not merely a label.  Where 
gender distinctions are deeply entrenched in the social fabric, as they are in the 
United States,46 sex-appropriate names for individuals facilitate social interaction by 
contributing to the appearance of the named individuals.  To be exact, sex-linked 
names assist a society in placing individuals in gender roles, and like all social roles, 
gender roles involve conventions regarding appropriate behavior towards, as well as 
by, the occupants of the roles.47  In the context of gender, then, the names of 
individuals shape appearances and, in doing so, aid the functioning of society.  
Second, evaluations of the physical features of an individual affect judgments that 
others make of the individual.48  Thus, student beliefs about the physical 
attractiveness of their college professors markedly influence the students’ ratings of 
                                                                
42Theodore N. Greenstein & J. David Knottnerus, The Effects of Differential Evaluations 
on Status Generalization, 43 SOC. PSYCHOL. Q. 147 (1980); Jolanda Jetten et al., Group 
Distinctiveness and Intergroup Discrimination, in SOCIAL IDENTITY: CONTEXT, COMMITMENT, 
CONTENT 107 (Naomi Ellemers et al., eds., 1999). 
431 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 566 (2nd ed. 1989). 
44To employ a colloquialism, “‘[r]eality’ is the only word in the English language that 
should always be used in quotes.”  Author unknown, quoted in COLE’S QUOTABLES, The 
Quotations Page, http://www.quotationspage.com (last visited Nov. 7, 2006). 
45Stanley Lieberson et al., The Instability of Androgynous Names: The Symbolic 
Maintenance of Gender Boundaries, 105 AM. J. SOC. 1249, 1260-1261, 1274 (2000). 
46The degree to which Americans at the present time are committed to traditional sex roles 
is indicated by responses to a question included in a national sample survey of adults who 
resided in the United States in 1990.  Gallup Organization accession no. 237354 (May-June 
1990), available at LEXIS, News and Business, RPOLL file.  The question began by 
mentioning change in sex roles and then asked interviewees to express their agreement or 
disagreement with the statement that “A job is alright but what most women really want is a 
home and children.”  Id.  Exactly half of all respondents agreed with the statement, while just 
two out of five respondents disagreed with it.  Id.  The percentages agreeing and disagreeing 
differed little between women and men.  Id. 
47See Mary R. Jackman & Mary Scheuer Senter, Images of Social Groups: Categorical or 
Qualified?, 44 PUB. OPINION Q. 341, 355, 358 (1980); Tom Langford & Neil J. Mackinnon, 
The Affective Bases for the Gendering of Traits: Comparing the United States and Canada, 63 
SOC. PSYCHOL. Q. 34 (2000). 
48Robert B. Cialdini & Melanie R. Trost, Social Influence:  Social Norms, Conformity, and 
Compliance, in HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 41, at 151, 174. 
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the teaching quality of the professors;49 judgments of the relative competence of 
opposing candidates for Congress that are based on the candidates’ faces evidently 
have a major bearing on the outcome of elections;50 and the degree to which the 
facial traits of cadets at a military academy indicate dominance (rather than 
submissiveness) affects the rank achieved by the cadets at the academy.51  In short, 
the appearance of an individual has an impact on responses to the individual by 
others. 
My concern, however, is not with appearances qua appearances but with 
appearances as symbols.  What is responsible for infusing appearances with 
symbolism?  The question encompasses appearances in many contexts, but I will 
consider just one, namely, law.  Law acts as a symbol when, inter alia, it addresses 
(e.g., regulates) appearances of a phenomenon that is significant to society,52 and law 
that is explicitly directed at protecting (or eliminating) a recognized symbol of a 
socially significant phenomenon is symbolic, too.  The symbolism of such law 
results from stimulus generalization, a phenomenon identified in the 1920s by the 
noted scientist Ivan Pavlov that has come to be regarded by psychologists as an 
                                                                
49James Felton et al., Web-based Student Evaluations of Professors:  The Relations 
Between Perceived Quality, Easiness, and Sexiness, 29 ASSESSMENT & EVALUATION IN 
HIGHER EDUC. 91, 100-101, 106 (2004). 
The heavy reliance that colleges and universities place on student-completed teaching 
evaluation questionnaires is illustrative of the importance of appearances, even in 
organizations that are ostensibly committed to rationality and empirically grounded 
knowledge.  Research indicates that the questionnaires are not highly accurate measures of the 
degree to which students master assigned material.  Larry D. Barnett, Are Teaching Evaluation 
Questionnaires Valid? Assessing the Evidence, 25 J. COLLECTIVE NEGOTIATIONS 335 (1996).  
Moreover, relatively little is known about the negative effects of the questionnaires on faculty 
members and students.  Id. at 343.  Appearances, therefore, are the primary basis for the use of 
the questionnaires in personnel decisions by organizations of higher education. 
50Alexander Todorov et al., Inferences of Competence from Faces Predict Election 
Outcomes, 308 SCI. 1623, 1623 (2005). 
51Allan Mazur et al., Military Rank Attainment of a West Point Class: Effects of Cadets’ 
Physical Features, 90 AM. J. SOC. 125, 140 (1984). 
52If law is symbolic when it deals with appearances of activities that are significant to 
society, empirical research must be able to distinguish activities that are “significant” from 
activities that are not.  Unfortunately, theory in the sociology of law currently seems to be of 
little or no help to researchers who are seeking to measure societal significance, which is 
potentially ascertained from objective measures, from subjective measures, or from both.  
Objectively, societal significance might be determined from quantitative data on conditions in 
the society; such data on the United States are found inter alia in studies of the population of 
the country undertaken by federal government agencies.  Subjectively, societal significance 
might be determined from the attitudes and values of the participants in society; data on 
attitudes and values are available from surveys conducted by organizations in the private 
sector using samples drawn from the population.  The study of symbols in law will be limited 
until sociological theory aids researchers in selecting both the most suitable approach to 
societal significance—objective, subjective, or an objective-subjective combination—and the 
most appropriate data within the approach. 
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“undeniable characteristic” of human learning.53  Stimulus generalization, simply 
described, involves a stimulus to which individuals learn a particular response and 
which is subsequently joined by at least one additional stimulus that spontaneously 
produces the response.  Thus, stimulus generalization begins with the establishment 
of a link between an initial stimulus and a certain reaction through positive and/or 
negative reinforcement, i.e., reward and/or punishment; after the connection between 
the initial stimulus and the reaction has been created, one or more other stimuli 
generate the reaction without any reinforcement.54  In the context of the present 
article, the initial stimulus would be appearances, the second stimulus would be law 
that deals with appearances, and the response to each stimulus would be the social 
meaning that constitutes a symbol.55 
By way of illustration, the national flag of the United States, as a tangible 
representation (i.e., appearance) of the country, is an acknowledged symbol.56  The 
symbolism of the flag exists because the referent of the flag—the Nation—is socially 
significant, and to promote and preserve this symbolism, federal statutes specify the 
settings, circumstances, and manner in which the flag is to be displayed.57  Thus, a 
federal statute seeks to preserve the symbolism of the flag by explicitly providing, 
inter alia, that “[n]o disrespect should be shown to the flag of the United States of 
America; the flag should not be dipped to any person or thing.”58  Through stimulus 
generalization, statutes such as these acquire symbolism from the symbolism of the 
flag. 
Stimulus generalization has been employed in theoretical analyses to explain 
social phenomena59 and in empirical research to account for symbolism in a law-
based government program.60  If it is widespread in social life, stimulus 
generalization can be expected to occur with law that deals with appearances of 
socially important phenomena, and the learned reaction that confers symbolism on 
such appearances will be transferred to law focusing on these appearances.  The 
present article specifically assumes that stimulus generalization does so, although the 
assumption has not been tested empirically by social scientists.  Under the thesis of 
                                                                
53David I. Mostofsky, Introduction, in STIMULUS GENERALIZATION 1, 1-2 (David I. 
Mostofsky ed., 1965). 
54Id. at 1. 
55See supra text accompanying notes 28 to 33.  In terms of strength and salience, the 
symbolism of particular appearances is probably never less than, and in most cases probably 
exceeds, the symbolism of law concerned with these appearances. 
56E.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 405 (1989). 
574 U.S.C. §§ 6, 7 (2000). 
58
 Id. § 8. 
59Robert A. LeVine, The Role of Family in Authority Systems:  A Cross-Cultural 
Application of Stimulus-Generalization Theory, 5 BEHAV. SCI. 291 (1960); Richard M. 
Merelman, Learning and Legitimacy, 60 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 548, 558 (1966); Robert Frank 
Weiss, Defection from Social Movements and Subsequent Recruitment to New Movements, 26 
SOCIOMETRY 1 (1963). 
60David O. Sears et al., Whites’ Opposition to “Busing”: Self-Interest or Symbolic 
Politics?, 73 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 369, 381 (1979). 
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the article, then, dress codes for students imposed by public schools are symbolic.  
The symbolism of dress codes arises because the codes target physical appearances 
that have social meaning; through stimulus generalization, the meaning of the 
physical appearances attaches to the dress codes applicable to the appearances and 
makes the codes symbolic.61 
While tangential to the article, law that does not focus on appearances may also 
be symbolic.  Specifically, law can serve as a symbol when it applies directly to or 
reflects the particular phenomenon for which it was formulated.  At least two types 
of law in a society are in this category.  They are symbolic because their function “is 
not so much to guide society, as to comfort it.”62 
The first type of law that is symbolic, even though it does not focus on 
appearances, is law that is designed to regulate a socially significant activity.63  Law 
of this type is expected by participants in the society that adopts it to be effective in 
substantially altering the frequency of the activity, but, in fact, the law has little or no 
influence on the incidence of the activity.  Illustrations of such law include: (i) state 
statutes that authorize the death penalty for individuals who commit the crime of 
murder, (ii) state legislation that bars employment policies requiring union 
                                                                
61In a survey conducted during 2002, a nationwide sample of adults in the United States 
was asked whether “[s]etting dress codes in public schools that stop students from wearing 
clothes that are too revealing or sloppy” would be “an effective solution for improving 
people’s behavior.”  In answering the question, respondents selected one of the following:  
“very effective,” “somewhat effective,” “not too effective,” “not effective at all.”  More than 
half (55%) of the respondents thought dress codes would be “very effective.”  Public Agenda 
Foundation accession no. 401631 (Jan. 2-23, 2002), available at LEXIS, News and Business, 
RPOLL File.  Accord, Public Agenda Foundation accession no. 456449 (March 11-18, 2004), 
available at LEXIS, News and Business, RPOLL File (national sample of adult parents of 
public school students who were in grades 5-12).  Because the personal attire under 
consideration breached accepted social standards (i.e., because the attire was “too revealing or 
sloppy”), the behavior that would be “improved” by dress codes presumably violated social 
standards, too.  The belief that dress codes are a means of reducing socially unacceptable 
behavior links attire to the character of social life.  This link—which confers meaning on 
personal attire and, in turn, dress codes—is evidently well-entrenched and widespread in the 
United States inasmuch as most respondents believed that dress codes would be highly 
effective in enhancing social behavior.  School codes that bar grooming that deviates from 
social norms seem to have been generally favored by Americans since at least the mid-1960s.  
See Gallup Organization accession no. 39949 (Sept. 16-21, 1965), available at LEXIS, News 
and Business, RPOLL File. 
Under my thesis, most if not all of the physical appearances targeted by dress codes are 
symbolic even if the individuals affected by the codes have no intent to communicate a 
political or social message through their physical appearance.  My thesis, therefore, is broader 
than existing case law on the constitutionality of government-decreed dress codes.  See Wendy 
Mahling, Note, Secondhand Codes: An Analysis of the Constitutionality of Dress Codes in the 
Public Schools, 80 MINN. L. REV. 715 (1996).  Furthermore, my thesis contends that the dress 
codes themselves are symbolic when they address physical appearances characterized by 
symbolism. 
62ARNOLD, supra note 6, at 34. 
63The regulatory law discussed in this paragraph is not concerned with appearances, but 
regulation is the goal of much, if not most, of the law that focuses on appearances.  Regulatory 
law dealing with appearances is the subject of Parts III and IV of this article. 
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membership or requiring abstention from union membership, and (iii) statutes that on 
their face are intended to prohibit abortion.  In spite of the widespread, relatively 
intense feelings that have accompanied each of these topics64—feelings that have 
undoubtedly helped to instill symbolism into law on the topics—such law has 
evidently not had an appreciable impact on the murder rate,65 on the percentage of 
                                                                
64Surveys of national samples of adults in the United States found that, from the mid-
1980s to the mid-1990s, between 53% and 67% of all respondents either “strongly” endorsed 
or “strongly” opposed capital punishment.  Center for Political Studies accession no. 259987 
(Nov. 9, 1994-Jan. 9, 1995), available at LEXIS, News and Business, RPOLL File; General 
Social Survey accession no. 192100 (Feb.-Apr. 1991), available at LEXIS, News and 
Business, RPOLL File; Center for Political Studies accession no. 211923 (Nov. 8, 1988-Jan. 
30, 1989), available at LEXIS, News and Business, RPOLL File; Gallup Organization 
accession no. 25761 (Jan. 10-13, 1986), available at LEXIS, News and Business, RPOLL File. 
A survey of a national sample of adults in the United States in 1965 measured the strength 
of attitudes toward state legislation that allows employees to choose whether to join a union 
(popularly labeled “right-to-work” legislation).  Only one in four Americans was neutral on 
the issue — just 15% of the respondents expressed “little or no concern” with such legislation, 
and an additional 11% had “no opinion” on the legislation.  On the other hand, “very strong 
concern” with the legislation was expressed by 38%, and “a fair amount of concern” was 
expressed by an additional 36%.  Opinion Research Corp. accession no. 101530 (Nov. 22-Dec. 
10, 1965), available at LEXIS, News and Business, RPOLL File.  Right-to-work legislation, 
given the number of questions asked about it in public opinion polls, was evidently a salient 
subject to Americans during most of the last half of the twentieth century.  See Public Opinion 
Online, available at LEXIS, News and Business, RPOLL File.  The legislation is viewed as 
having been accompanied by important economic change.  Eric Tucker, “Great Expectations” 
Defeated?: The Trajectory of Collective Bargaining Regimes in Canada and the United States 
Post-NAFTA, 26 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 97, 106 (2004). 
Approximately two-thirds of all adults in the United States in 2001 felt “strongly” about 
the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade, i.e., either “strongly” favored or 
“strongly” opposed the decision, which established for women a constitutional right to an 
abortion.  Los Angeles Times accession no. 381074 (March 3-5, 2001), available at LEXIS, 
News and Business, RPOLL File; Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
These topics, in short, are significant to society.  As a result, they can be expected to 
spawn important social products — in particular, symbols.  See Barnett, supra note 4, at 821-
24. 
65Kevin B. Smith, Explaining Variation in State-Level Homicide Rates: Does Crime 
Policy Pay?, 59 J. POL. 350, 355, 360-61 (1997).  The most recent rigorous study of the death 
penalty, which used annual data on counties for the period 1977 through 1996, found that the 
impact of capital punishment differed between states and that executions, while reducing the 
number of murders in some states, increased the number of murders or had no effect in other 
states.  When the effects in all of the states were aggregated, the net number of murders that 
executions were estimated to have prevented in 1977-1996 was roughly 1,672.  Joanna M. 
Shepherd, Deterrence Versus Brutalization: Capital Punishment’s Differing Impacts Among 
States, 104 MICH. L. REV. 203, 232 (2005).  During the twenty years covered by the study, 
however, the number of murders in the United States totaled 427,600.  Calculated from U.S. 
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1988, at table 263 
(108th ed. 1987), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/www/abs/statab.html; U.S. BUREAU 
OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1998, at table 335 (108th ed. 
1998), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/www/abs/statab.html.  Consequently, 
executions between 1977 and 1996 reduced the number of murders that would have occurred 
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nonagricultural workers who are union members,66 or on the percentage of 
pregnancies that women choose to terminate.67 
The second type of law that does not emphasize appearances but is symbolic is 
law that merely expresses dominant values of the society.  Law of this type does not 
directly regulate activity but, rather, affirms salient social ideals, and it is illustrated 
by the federal Defense of Marriage Act.  The pertinent provision of the Act permits 
states and other U.S. jurisdictions (territories, possessions and Indian tribes) to deny 
recognition to same-sex marriages from another jurisdiction even though the 
marriages are lawful in the latter.68  The Act endorses both the traditional conception 
of marriage (and its associated gender roles69) and the longstanding authority of 
                                                          
in these years by 1,672/(427,600 + 1,672) = 1,672/429,272 = 0.00389 x 100 = 0.389%, i.e., by 
approximately four-tenths of one percent. 
In addition, statutes establishing prison sentences for criminal conduct have a negligible 
influence on the overall rate of major crimes.  Tomislav V. Kovandzic, The Impact of 
Florida’s Habitual Offender Law on Crime, 39 CRIMINOLOGY 179 (2001); Thomas B. Marvell 
& Carlisle E. Moody, The Impact of Enhanced Prison Terms for Felonies Committed with 
Guns, 33 CRIMINOLOGY 247 (1995); Lisa Stolzenberg & Stewart J. D’Alessio, “Three Strikes 
and You’re Out”: The Impact of California’s New Mandatory Sentencing Law on Serious 
Crime Rates, 43 CRIME & DELINQ. 457 (1997); Tamasak Witayapanyanon, Criminal Justice 
Policy in the United States: A Pooled Time-Series Analysis of Sentencing Reform Acts 211-
212, 223-224 (1989) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Southern Illinois University) (on file 
with Widener University Library). 
66Keith Lumsden & Craig Petersen, The Effect of Right-to-Work Laws on Unionization in 
the United States, 83 J. POL. ECON. 1237 (1975).  Because union membership in a state is not 
materially affected by whether a right-to-work statute has been adopted in the state, such 
statutes and their political precursors are “symbol rather than substance.”  Id. at 1248. 
67Social science research has found that the legalization of abortion in the United States 
had no more than a small impact on the aggregate number of births in the nation as a whole 
and in individual states.  Timothy D. Hogan, An Intervention Analysis of the Effects of 
Legalized Abortion Upon U.S. Fertility, 3 POPULATION RES. & POL’Y REV. 201, 214-215 
(1984).  The legalization of abortion is also estimated to have had a small effect on the average 
number of lifetime births per woman.  Jacob Alex Klerman, U.S. Abortion Policy and 
Fertility, 89 AM. ECON. REV., May 1999, at 261, 264.  Among white women, the reduction in 
lifetime fertility was found to be less than 3.0%.  Calculated from id. at table 1.  The absence 
of a major impact on white women is notable because white women comprised the vast 
majority of all women who were in their childbearing years during and following the period 
when abortion law changed.  In 1970 and 1980, for example, white females were 
approximately 87% and 85%, respectively, of all females residing in the United States who 
were age 15 to 44.  Calculated from U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF 
THE UNITED STATES: 1982-83 (103rd ed. 1982), at table 31, available at 
http://www.census.gov/prod/www/ abs/statab1951-1994.htm. 
The preceding studies, in supporting the conclusion that U.S. law on abortion has 
minimally influenced the proportion of pregnancies that are intentionally interrupted, suggest 
that such law serves chiefly as a symbol. 
6828 U.S.C. § 1738C (2000). 
69See Sylvia A. Law, Homosexuality and the Social Meaning of Gender, 1988 WIS. L. 
REV. 187, 196. 
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states to define marriage.70  Indeed, an express purpose of the Act was to affirm state 
sovereignty over marriage so that a state can, if it chooses, exclude from the status of 
marriage couples comprised of individuals of the same sex.71  Because the Act 
merely recognizes the existing authority of states to regulate marriage rather than 
altering that authority, the Act is purely symbolic.72 
In the present article, however, I concentrate on appearances that a phenomenon 
is present, and I contend that law dealing with appearances of a socially salient 
phenomenon is symbolic.  Although not all law applies to such appearances, some 
law probably must do so.  Why do these appearances become the subject of law?  
The answer is that attitudes and behaviors toward a group (including an institution)73 
are shaped by beliefs regarding whether the group acts in a just manner,74 and these 
beliefs are molded by appearances.  Thus, although jurisprudence and scholarship on 
it have long distinguished “substance” from “form”75 and often expressed a 
preference for substance over form,76 the appearances generated by the form of 
judicial proceedings have been recognized as a factor that affects the trust of the 
public in the institution of law.77 
In sum, appearances of phenomena that are important to a social system give 
symbolism to law addressing the appearances, and the symbols of law aid a society 
in securing the commitment of its participants.78  For every group, of course, the 
commitment of its participants is vital, because to the extent that participant 
commitment is lacking, the ability of a group to operate smoothly and effectively 
will be hampered.79  If a society is to benefit from an institution, moreover, the 
                                                                
70H.R. Rep. No. 104-664, at 2 (1996), as reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905, 2906. 
71Id., at 2-3, 25, 27,  as reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905, 2906, 2907, 2929, 2931. 
72Denise C. Morgan & Rebecca E. Zietlow, The New Parity Debate: Congress and Rights 
of Belonging, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 1347, 1385 (2005). 
73Since the word “group” is employed here to refer to an organized set of individuals, an 
institution is a type of group. 
74Tom R. Tyler & Heather J. Smith, Social Justice and Social Movements, in HANDBOOK 
OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 41, at 595, 595, 606, 611-612.  
75E.g., Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. 540, 573 (1840). 
76E.g., John T. Parry, The Virtue of Necessity: Reshaping Culpability and the Rule of Law, 
36 HOUS. L. REV. 397, 462 (1999); Ronald H. Jensen, Of Form and Substance: Tax-Free 
Incorporations and Other Transactions Under Section 351, 11 VA. TAX REV. 349, 372 (1991). 
77United States v. Lastra, 973 F.2d 952, 956 (D.C. Cir. 1992). 
78See CERULO, supra note 9, at 15-27.  The promotion of societal cohesion is among the 
goals sought to be achieved by government in regulating the physical appearance of 
individuals.  See Miller v. School Dist. No. 167, 495 F.2d 658, 664 (7th Cir. 1974).  
Government regulation of individuals’ physical appearance is discussed earlier in this article.  
See supra note 61 and accompanying text. 
79Levine & Moreland, supra note 41, at 428; Charles A. O’Reilly III et al., Work Group 
Demography, Social Integration, and Turnover, 34 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 21, 33-34 (1989).  See 
Wayne Busby, Social Integration and Community Health 79-81, 86 (1985) (unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation, Univ. of Oklahoma); Sung-Soon Clara Kim, Dimensions of Social Integration: 
Solidarity and Deviance in American Cities 142-148 (1985) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 
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institution must be perceived as fair, i.e., as just.  The institution of law has 
acknowledged the necessity of perceptions of fairness:  in the words of the United 
States Supreme Court, “justice must satisfy the appearance of justice.”80 
As defined in this article, a symbol is a stimulus that is visible, audible, or 
touchable and that represents a thing that is of significance to society; such stimuli 
include appearances that society deems important.  Two illustrations of the 
symbolism of appearances and of pertinent law may be helpful.  First, American 
ideals require a substantial distance between the institution of government and the 
institution of religion,81 a requirement that is embodied in the Religion Clauses of the 
First Amendment to the United States Constitution.82  Consequently, appearances 
that powers of government are being shared with religious entities have been found 
by the United States Supreme Court to constitute symbols that implicate (and 
violate) the First Amendment.83  As a second illustration, certain physical attributes 
of individuals generate reactions by others,84 and one of the attributes that does so is 
body hair.  Numerous cultures specify the manner of dealing with body hair,85 and in 
the United States, the social definition of females and males involves unequivocal 
sex-based differences as to the management of hair.  For instance, “[t]he gender 
norm that says that women’s skin should be smooth and bare (and the social 
opprobrium that accordingly rains down on any woman who goes unshaven)” 
contribute to sex-based differences in grooming.86  Body hair, being a factor in the 
appearances of gender, is symbolic because it is linked to social roles and thus is 
                                                          
University of Virginia) (on file with Widener University Library); Thorolfur Thorlindsson & 
Jón Gunnar Bernburg, Durkheim’s Theory of Social Order and Deviance: a Multi-level Test, 
20 EUR. SOC. REV. 271 (2004).  See also Uberto Gatti et al., Civic Community and Juvenile 
Delinquency, 43 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 22 (2003) (data analysis consistent with an inverse 
relationship between degree of social integration and incidence of the most serious violent 
crimes).  Cf. Thomas A. Petee et al., Levels of Social Integration in Group Contexts and the 
Effects of Informal Sanction Threat on Deviance, 32 CRIMINOLOGY 85 (1994) (concluding that 
the ability of informal sanctions to prevent illegal behavior rises with the degree of social 
integration in a group). 
80Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954); In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 
(1955). 
81In 2002, for example, a survey of a national sample of adults in the United States found 
that eight out of ten respondents “completely” or “mostly” agreed with the statement that 
“Religion is a matter of personal faith and should be kept separate from government policy.”  
Pew Research Center accession no. 431836 (Aug. 19-Sept. 8, 2002), available at LEXIS, 
News and Business, RPOLL File.  
82
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the 
free exercise thereof.”  U.S. CONST. amend. I.  These provisions also apply to the states and 
their subdivisions.  Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Gordon, 542 U.S. 1, 8 & n.4 (2004). 
83Bd. of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 696-97 (1994).  See also Doe v. Shenandoah 
County Sch. Bd., 737 F. Supp. 913, 918 (W.D. Va. 1990).  
84See supra notes 48-51 and accompanying text. 
85Deborah Pergament, It's Not Just Hair: Historical and Cultural Considerations for an 
Emerging Technology, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 41 (1999). 
86Louise M. Antony, Back to Androgeny: What Bathrooms Can Teach Us About Equality, 
9 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 1, 7 (1998). 
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significant to society.  In terms of law, constitutional and statutory doctrines have 
arisen from sex distinctions in the policies of government entities and private 
employers regarding the length of head hair,87 and through stimulus generalization, 
these doctrines have become symbols. 
In concluding part II, let me identify the key points that underlie the 
macrosociological perspective I am proposing.  A society, to operate effectively, 
must have the commitment of its participants generally, but such commitment 
requires that the participants trust the institutions of their society and regard the 
institutions as fair.88  Otherwise expressed, a society will be viable to the extent its 
participants believe that the institutions of the society provide social justice.89  Given 
that the content of law is a response to the recognized needs and dominant values of 
society,90 the concepts and doctrines of law, and the definitions of social justice that 
they advance,91 undergo change when societal conditions are altered.92 
The present article, in focusing on concepts and doctrines of law that operate as 
symbols, contends that the bond between a society and its participants is 
strengthened by law that is symbolic.  The symbols of law strengthen the bond 
because they incorporate established notions of social justice and “[a]ppearance— 
symbolism—is critical in any system of justice.”93  The concepts and doctrines of 
law, then, aid society by their symbolism, and they are symbolic when, inter alia, 
they are applied to appearances of socially significant phenomena because the 
symbolism of the latter is, through stimulus generalization, acquired by law. 
From a macrosociological perspective, then, the fact that law is an institution of 
society is not attributable to the efforts of particular individuals or due to mere 
                                                                
87Pergament, supra note 85, at 52-54, 56.  See also Stacey S. Baron, Note, (Un)Lawfully 
Beautiful: The Legal (De)Construction of Female Beauty, 46 B.C. L. REV. 359 (2005) 
(discussing sex-based head hair grooming policies as part of “appearance discrimination” 
generally and labeling court decisions and statutes on appearance discrimination as 
“appearance law”). 
88See Joel Brockner et al., The Influence of Prior Commitment to an Institution on 
Reactions to Perceived Unfairness: The Higher They Are, The Harder They Fall, 37 ADMIN. 
SCI. Q. 241 (1992) [hereinafter Brockner I]; Joel Brockner et al., When Trust Matters: The 
Moderating Effect of Outcome Favorability, 42 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 558 (1997). 
89Instances of perceived social injustice evidently reduce commitment to a group among 
participants who are strongly committed, but instances of perceived social justice do not seem 
to increase commitment among participants who are weakly committed.  Consequently, “it 
may be much easier to break, rather than build[,] . . . organizational commitment.”  Brockner 
I, supra note 88, at 260. 
90BARNETT, supra note 3, at 16-19. 
91In this regard, the English jurist William Blackstone was correct in his observation that 
“[l]aw is the embodiment of the moral sentiment of the people.”  CLASSIC QUOTES, The 
Quotations Page, http://www.quotationspage.com (last visited Nov. 7, 2006). 
92Collins v. United Mine Workers of Am. Welfare & Ret. Fund, 298 F. Supp. 964, 968 (D. 
D.C. 1969), aff’d, 439 F.2d 494 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Hay v. Med. Ctr. Hosp., 496 A.2d 939, 944 
(Vt. 1985); Semler v. Oregon State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs, 34 P.2d 311, 313 (Or. 1934). 
93Eugene R. Fidell, The Culture of Change in Military Law, 126 MIL. L. REV. 125, 132 
(1989). 
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coincidence.  Instead, law is an institution because, as a servant rather than a master 
of society,94 it benefits the social system.  This benefit is supplied partially through 
symbols, a mechanism that permits the existence of widespread interpersonal 
relationships and, hence, social life. 
III.  THE STATUTORY DEFINITION OF THE OCCUPATION OF INVESTMENT ADVISER 
A statute enacted by a legislature may not on its face encompass appearances, but 
through interpretation by courts and administrative agencies, it may be extended to 
appearances.  The application of law to appearances, therefore, may not be obvious 
and easily ascertained; instead, whether appearances have been brought within the 
scope of a statute may be determinable only from documents construing the statute.  
To illustrate this point, I will use the occupation of investment adviser and, in 
particular, the definition of the occupation under federal law.  The topic 
demonstrates the often-subtle role of appearances in law.95 
Congress has defined the occupation of “investment adviser” in both the 
Investment Company Act and the Investment Advisers Act (“Advisers Act”), but the 
definition in the former Act is concerned exclusively with the parties furnishing 
recommendations to investment companies regarding the acquisition and/or 
disposition of securities by the companies.96  The definition in the Advisers Act 
contains no such limitation.  Specifically, section 202(a)(11) of the Advisers Act 
declares an investment adviser to be 
[A]ny person who, for compensation, engages in the business of advising 
others, either directly or through publications or writings, as to the value 
of securities or as to the advisability of investing in, purchasing, or selling 
securities, or who, for compensation and as part of a regular business, 
issues or promulgates analyses or reports concerning securities.97 
Subject to certain exceptions, a person satisfying this definition (“Advisers Act 
definition”) must register with, and conform to applicable rules of, the Securities and 
Exchange Commission if the person uses the mail system or any channel of interstate 
commerce in the United States to engage in business as an investment adviser.98 
                                                                
94See George v. Jordan Marsh Co., 268 N.E.2d 915, 918 (Mass. 1971) (referring to the 
“ever changing conditions of the society which the law is intended to serve.”). 
95See Greenberg v. Kimmelman, 494 A.2d 294, 299 (N.J. 1985) (state statute regulating 
employment in casinos must be “concerned not only with impropriety, but also with its 
appearance, which is always more subtle than impropriety itself.”). 
9615 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(20) (2000).  A party supplying securities advice will not be an 
investment adviser under the Investment Company Act unless the entity receiving the advice 
qualifies as an investment company.  The statutory criteria for an investment company are in 
section 3 of the Act.  15 U.S.C. § 80a-3. 
9715 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11).  A “person” is either “a natural person or a company”; a 
company includes “a corporation, a partnership, an association, a joint-stock company, a trust, 
or any organized group of persons, whether incorporated or not . . . .”  Id. §§ 80b-2(a)(5), 80b-
2(a)(16). 
9815 U.S.C. § 80b-3(a). 
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The discussion below will focus solely on the Advisers Act definition, because 
this definition is applicable to a much larger number of persons—and is therefore of 
much greater practical importance—than the definition of investment adviser in the 
Investment Company Act.  Any investment adviser under the latter Act will be an 
investment adviser under the Advisers Act,99 but an investment adviser under the 
Advisers Act may not be an investment adviser under the Investment Company Act 
because a person meeting the Advisers Act definition of investment adviser can 
serve clients that are not investment companies.  As a result, investment advisers 
under the Advisers Act are responsible for the securities portfolios of not just 
investment companies (e.g., mutual funds) but of other clients as well, and all of the 
securities portfolios they manage have a combined market value that far exceeds the 
market value of the securities portfolios of investment companies.100 
Why is the occupation of investment adviser of social significance in the United 
States?  The answer may not be immediately obvious inasmuch as the products with 
which investment advisers work (viz., securities) are, on the surface, economic in 
character.  Nonetheless, the occupation of investment adviser has important 
implications for American society.  Economic matters can have major social 
consequences,101 and in the case of investment advisers, such consequences are 
unavoidable because the occupation directly affects a large portion of the public.  
Specifically, in 2005, close to one-half (47.5%) of all households in the United States 
owned shares of at least one mutual fund (the most common form of investment 
company); the households that owned mutual fund shares had an investment in a 
median of four funds and had a median of 47% of their financial assets in the 
funds.102 
An examination of the definition of investment adviser in the Advisers Act 
reveals that the definition encompasses more than a single type of activity.  
Specifically, the definition designates as an investment adviser “any person who” 
(italics added), employs the word “who” not once but twice, and precedes the second 
“who” with the word “or.”  Each “who” is accompanied by a description of a set of 
activities, moreover, and the descriptions differ markedly in their wording.  Given 
                                                                
9915 U.S.C. § 80b-3(b)(3); Cornelius C. Rose Associates, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 
1978 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 360, at *2 (Jan. 6, 1978).  
100See Proxy Voting by Investment Advisers, Investment Advisers Act Release No. IA-
2059, 67 Fed. Reg. 60,841 (Sept. 26, 2002).  The Release estimates the market value of 
portfolios over which investment advisers under the Advisers Act have discretionary authority 
to be approximately $19 trillion.  Id.  The Release also reports the market value of the 
portfolios of mutual funds, i.e., of open-end management investment companies.  15 U.S.C. §§ 
80a-4, 80a-5 (2000).  Data are evidently for the end of 2001.  At that time, the net assets of 
mutual funds amounted to $6.97 trillion, while the other common forms of investment 
companies—closed-end funds, exchange-traded funds, and unit investment trusts—had assets 
worth, respectively, $141 billion, $83 billion, and $49 billion.  INVESTMENT COMPANY 
INSTITUTE, 2006 INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK 71, 81-83 (46th ed. 2006), available at 
http://www.icifactbook.org/pdf/2006_factbook.pdf. 
101Caroline Hodges Persell, The Interdependence of Social Justice and Civil Society, 12 
SOC. F. 149 (1997). 
102INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE, supra note 100, at 47-48. 
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the significance of individual words in a statute,103 two separate classes of activity 
are within the scope of the definition of investment adviser in section 202(a)(11).  
The subject of both classes, however, is conduct that is business in nature. 
Although one class of activity under the Advisers Act definition involves a 
“business” and the other class involves a “regular business,” the Division of 
Investment Management (“Division”) of the Securities and Exchange Commission 
has taken the position that the business element of the definition has the same 
character in each of the two classes of activity comprising the occupation of 
investment adviser as defined in section 202(a)(11).104  Regardless of whether the 
Division is correct in this regard, the concept of “business” is basic to the definition.  
Accordingly, there must be a “business” that supplies investment advice, or furnishes 
reports or analyses, regarding securities, and the fundamental attributes of a business 
inhere in every type of advisory service provided.  But what are these attributes? 
One of the attributes that can place a person in the investment advisory business, 
according to the Division, is “hold[ing] himself out as an investment adviser or as 
one who provides investment advice.”105  Notably, the “[h]olding oneself out” 
attribute also has a bearing at other points in the definition of investment adviser in 
section 202(a)(11).  For example, the section excludes lawyers, accountants, 
engineers, and teachers from the definition of investment adviser when their 
investment advice “is solely incidental to the practice of [their] profession,”106 and 
the staff has concluded that the exclusion is unavailable to any of the designated 
professionals who holds herself/himself out publicly as an investment adviser.107  
Similarly, section 202(a)(11) excludes brokers and dealers from the definition of 
investment adviser if inter alia they supply investment advice in a manner that is 
“solely incidental” to their broker-dealer business.108  This exclusion, under a 
Commission rule, is unavailable when a broker or dealer, in furnishing advice that is 
a component of a financial plan or that is related to financial planning, “holds itself 
out generally to the public as a financial planner or as providing financial planning 
services.”109  Brokers and dealers that, in the context of a comprehensive analysis of 
                                                                
1032A NORMAN J. SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 46.06 (6th ed. 
2000). 
104Applicability of the Investment Advisers Act to Financial Planners, Pension 
Consultants, and Other Persons Who Provide Investment Advisory Services as a Component 
of Other Financial Services, Investment Advisers Act Release No. IA-1092, 52 Fed. Reg. 
38,400, 38,402 (Oct. 16, 1987) [hereinafter Release No. IA-1092]. 
105Id.  Investment advising is not the only occupation of which an individual can be 
deemed a member when the individual holds himself or herself out as being in the occupation.  
Thus, the ethical rules governing attorneys have been applied to an individual who, although 
not admitted to the bar, presented himself as an attorney.  Triffin v. DiSalvo, 643 A.2d 118 
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1994), appeal denied, 661 A.2d 874 (Pa. 1995). 
10615 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11)(B) (2000). 
107Release No. IA-1092, supra note 104, at 38,403.  Accord,  Hungerford, Aldrin, Nichols 
& Carter, SEC No-Action Letter, 1991 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 1420, at *2-3 (Dec. 10, 1991). 
10815 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11)(C) (2000). 
109Certain Broker-Dealers Deemed Not To Be Investment Advisers, Investment Advisers 
Act Release No. IA-2376, 70 Fed. Reg. 20,424, 20,454 (April 19, 2005) (to be codified at 17 
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the long-term financial requirements of a client, supply advice about securities to the 
client will not be doing so in connection with their brokerage business when they 
have portrayed themselves as engaged in investment advising.110  Any appearance of 
being an investment adviser, accordingly, renders these brokers and dealers 
ineligible for the statutory exclusion from the definition of investment adviser and 
triggers the status of investment adviser. 
In short, the “hold oneself out” standard is a recurring aspect of section 
202(a)(11).  That the standard is not uncommon in the definition of investment 
adviser may be traceable to section 203 of the Advisers Act.  Paragraph (a) of section 
203 mandates registration with the Securities and Exchange Commission of an 
investment adviser that employs mail or interstate commerce “in connection with his 
or its business.”111  However, paragraph (b)(3) of the section exempts from 
registration inter alia an investment adviser who has had no more than fourteen 
clients in the prior twelve months, who is not an investment adviser to an investment 
company that is registered with the Commission under the Investment Company Act, 
and who does not “hold[] himself out generally to the public as an investment 
adviser.”112  Thus, the “hold oneself out” standard is explicitly embedded in the 
Advisers Act. 
To hold out a thing as existing, of course, generates appearances of the thing.113  
For investment advisory services, a wide range of actions can hold out an entity or 
individual as an investment adviser and produce appearances that the services are 
offered by a business.  For example, an entity will evidently be deemed to have held 
itself out publicly as being in the investment advisory business if the entity has an 
office in a building whose directory not only lists the name of the entity but also 
identifies the entity as an “investment adviser.”114  Furthermore, an entity that 
                                                          
C.F.R. § 275.202(a)(11)-1(b)); Certain Broker-Dealers Deemed Not To Be Investment 
Advisers, Extension of Compliance Date, Investment Advisers Act Release No. IA-2426, 
2005 SEC LEXIS 2343 (Sept. 12, 2005). 
110Sec. Indus. Ass’n, SEC No-Action Letter, 2005 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 853, at *2-3 (Dec. 
16, 2005). 
11115 U.S.C. § 80b-3(a) (2000). 
11215 U.S.C. § 80b-3(b)(3).  Section 203(b)(3) does not exclude a person from the 
definition of investment adviser but permits a person qualifying as an investment adviser to 
conduct an investment advisory business through mail and interstate commerce without 
registering with the Commission. 
113See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 27 (1958) (creation of apparent 
authority); Andrews v. John E. Smith’s Sons Co., 369 So.2d 781, 785 (Ala. 1979) (imposition 
of liability on successor corporations for acts of their predecessor corporations). 
114Mr. Bate, SEC No-Action Letter, 1988 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 847, at *2 (June 28, 1988).  
The reply of the staff in this case dealt with section 203(b)(3) of the Advisers Act, the 
pertinent portion of which is discussed in the prior paragraph in the text.  The staff seems to 
consider the activities that comprise “holding out” under section 203(b)(3) to be the same 
activities that comprise “holding out” under the exclusions from the definition of investment 
adviser in section 202(a)(11).  See George J. Dippold, SEC No-Action Letter, 1990 SEC No-
Act. LEXIS 748, at *4 (May 7, 1990).  It is logical to presume, therefore, that these activities 
are also applicable to and determinative of the business element in the definition of investment 
adviser in section 202(a)(11). 
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furnishes recommendations to a bank regarding securities for the portfolio of a 
common fund operated by the bank as a trustee, executor, administrator or guardian 
will be holding itself out publicly as an investment adviser if (i) current or 
prospective participants in the fund are supplied with information they request about 
the entity and its significant personnel and investment strategies, (ii) meetings to 
discuss these matters are conducted with the officers of the entity at the request of 
current and prospective participants, and (iii) even one or two conferences, attended 
by representatives of the entity, are arranged each year by the bank for current and 
prospective participants.115  In short, persons recommending securities for purchase 
and/or sale will hold themselves out as investment advisers unless investment-
pertinent information about and from them is restricted.116  If these persons are not 
circumspect in making available such information, they may appear to be offering 
investment advice to potential clients and, therefore, may be required to register with 
the Commission as investment advisers. 
Let me return to a point made earlier.  Section 202(a)(11) of the Advisers Act 
encompasses two types of activity, each of which involves a business.  According to 
the section as written, however, one type of activity entails just a “business” while 
the other type entails a “regular business.”  The Division of Investment Management 
perceives no difference between a “business” and a “regular business,”117 but in 
terms of appearances, there seems to be a significant distinction. 
The terms “business” and “regular business” are found not only in the Advisers 
Act but also in the Securities Exchange Act (“Exchange Act”), and their presence in 
the latter Act is instructive.  Specifically, the Exchange Act designates as a “dealer” 
any party involved in a “business” of acquiring and disposing of securities for the 
personal account of the party, but the Act explicitly excludes a party from the status 
of dealer when the securities transactions do not comprise a “regular business” of the 
party.118  The word “business” by itself—i.e., even when unaccompanied by the word 
“regular”—“connotes a certain regularity of participation in purchasing and selling 
activities rather than a few isolated transactions.”119  Accordingly, a business comes 
into existence when, inter alia, an activity that is motivated largely by economic 
factors recurs with a frequency that surpasses a threshold—a threshold that is 
determined by judgment and not merely by numbers.120  However, Congress chose to 
include in two securities statutes not only the term “business” but also the term 
“regular business,” and it placed the terms in close proximity to one another.  
Congress must be presumed to have viewed the terms as having different referents 
                                                                
115Resource Bank & Trust, SEC No-Action Letter, 1991 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 624 (Mar. 
29, 1991). 
116See Thomson Financial, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, [2002 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. 
L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 78,318, at 78,517 (July 9, 2002), available at 2002 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 635. 
117Release No. IA-1092, supra note 104. 
11815 U.S.C. §§ 78c(a)(5)(A)-(B) (2000 & Supp. II 2002). 
119LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, 6 SECURITIES REGULATION 2980 (3d ed. 1990). 
120InTouch Global, LLC, SEC No-Action Letter, 1995 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 846, at *6 
(Nov. 14, 1995).  The differences between a business and a profession are discussed in 
Barnett, supra note 35, at 170-171, 173-178. 
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and wanted them distinguished, because in construing a securities statute, “we must 
give effect to every word that Congress used.”121 
What differentiates a “business” from a “regular business”?  Since the terms are 
not defined in either Act, they were evidently intended by Congress to convey the 
meanings they possess in everyday discourse.122  The obvious difference between the 
terms, of course, is that a “regular business” occurs more often than a “business,” 
and this difference has ramifications for appearances.  Specifically, a business that 
appears to be regular would generally be viewed as entailing activity of greater 
frequency than a business that lacks the appearance of regularity, and inaccurate 
appearances seem more likely to be due to malevolent intent or gross negligence 
when their referent is a “regular” business than when it is a “mere” business. 
What is the implication of this point for the Advisers Act?  The Act was designed 
to protect the public from fraud and manipulation123 and thus requires advisers to 
disclose conflicts of interest so that the public will believe securities markets are fair 
and will make the investments necessary for economic growth.124  The Securities and 
Exchange Commission may advance these goals more effectively if it distinguishes a 
regular business from a business that is not regular and, when dealing with 
appearances of them, focuses more on inaccurate appearances of a regular business.  
Inaccurate appearances of any activity are capable of injuring the public, of course, 
but some types of inaccurate appearances undoubtedly can harm the social fabric 
more frequently and more severely than other types.  Appearances influence the 
operation of the society in which they are found, and all else being equal, 
appearances that are erroneous may reduce trust and undermine social life more 
when they are associated with an activity (business) that is perceived as regular than 
when they are associated with an activity (business) that is perceived as not regular, 
because the exploitation of others is probably the principal motivation for inaccurate 
appearances of a regular activity.125 
Additionally, as the Advisers Act definition makes plain, securities are at the 
heart of the occupation of investment advising.  Appearances of a regular investment 
advisory business are likely to entail a larger number of explicit references to 
securities in communications with potential investors than appearances of a non-
regular investment advisory business.  At the same time, whether an instrument 
constitutes a security as a matter of law depends in part on its characterization by the 
promoter or seller, and an instrument is more likely to be deemed a security if it has 
                                                                
121Lowe v. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 472 U.S. 181, 208 n.53 (1985).  This principle is 
discussed in Singer, supra note 103. 
122Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 228 (1993). 
12315 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (2000); Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 
Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 189-191 (1963). 
124Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. at 201. 
125Cf. In re Paul K. Peers, Inc., 42 S.E.C. 539 (1965), available at 1965 SEC LEXIS 792 
(registration of corporate investment adviser revoked because adviser inter alia had willfully 
and erroneously implied in advertising material that it was a long-established organization and 
that it possessed a substantial staff with extensive experience in investment securities). 
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been presented to investors as a security.126  Logically, therefore, characterizations of 
an instrument as a security that are incorrect due to recklessness or fraud will occur 
most commonly with an investment adviser whose business appears to be regular.  
The cumulative impact of such incorrect characterizations can only impair trust in 
the financial sector of the economy and weaken the cohesiveness of society. 
IV.  THE APPEARANCE-OF-IMPROPRIETY STANDARD FOR ATTORNEY CONDUCT 
This article rests on the macrosociological proposition that the concepts and 
doctrines of law, partly if not chiefly by being symbols, in the long run promote 
participants’ commitment to, and hence strengthen, the social order.  Like all 
scientific propositions, the proposition that law furnishes symbols supporting the 
social system is empirically testable, albeit indirectly.  The proposition is based on 
the related assumptions that concepts and doctrines of law are responses to 
identifiable properties of society; that, being responses to societal properties, 
concepts and doctrines of law are suitable for the properties responsible for them; 
and that the responses are manifested in measurable relationships between the 
concepts and doctrines, on the one hand, and the societal properties, on the other.127  
The proposition and the assumptions behind it necessarily follow from the 
conceptualization of a society as a system.128  By definition, a system is organized, 
and organization is the antithesis of randomness.129  Therefore, the concepts and 
doctrines of law as an institution of society can be expected not to occur randomly 
but to be tied to conditions in the system.  I report below the results of a study that 
examines whether societal properties predict the use by states of a specific symbolic 
concept and doctrine in defining ethical standards for attorneys. 
A.  Model Ethical Standards Promulgated by the American Bar Association 
Explicit standards for the behavior of attorneys were initially adopted by the 
American Bar Association (“ABA”) during the first decade of the twentieth 
century.130  However, not until the third decade of the twentieth century do any ABA 
documents exhibit a concern with the appearances that the actions of attorneys 
                                                                
126Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. C. M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 351 (1943); Reves 
v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 66, 68-69 (1990).  In law, even an instrument that does not 
exist may be regarded as a security if its promoters have portrayed it as a security.  In re Euro-
Atlantic Securities, Inc., Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Admin. Proceeding File No. 3-9402 (Feb. 25, 
2000), 2000 SEC LEXIS 326, at *52-53 . 
127See John W. Mohr, Measuring Meaning Structures, 24 ANN. REV. SOC. 345 (1998). 
128See JOHN SCOTT, SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY 138-139 (1995); Kim, supra note 79, at 9-28, 
142-151. 
129Dictionary definitions of the word “system” include “[a] set or assemblage of things 
connected, associated, or interdependent, so as to form a complex unity; a whole composed of 
parts in orderly arrangement according to some scheme or plan.”  17 OXFORD ENGLISH 
DICTIONARY 496 (2nd ed. 1989). 
130James M. Altman, Considering the A.B.A.’s 1908 Canons of Ethics, 71 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 2395 (2003). 
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generate, and the focus at this time was on attorneys in limited types of situations.131  
In 1969, the ABA promulgated the Model Code of Professional Responsibility 
(“Model Code”),132 and under the Code, all attorneys were instructed to “avoid even 
the appearance of impropriety.”133  The admonition was evidently intended to build 
trust in the institution of law134 and to promote a belief in the fairness of the 
institution.135  Being an institution, law is by definition of major social significance, 
and given the prominence of law among the professions,136 so is the work of 
attorneys and judges.  Accordingly, the ethical standards applied by the institution to 
appearances generated by its professionals operate as symbols in society.137 
In specifying ethical requirements for attorneys, the Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct (“Model Rules”), which were released by the ABA in 1982,138 omitted the 
appearance-of-impropriety standard139 on the ground that the standard was 
ambiguous.140  Nonetheless, the ABA applies the standard to judges—and has done 
so since 1924 when it approved the Canons of Judicial Ethics.  Canon 4 in the 1924 
formulation required, inter alia, that “[a] judge’s official conduct should be free from 
impropriety and the appearance of impropriety.”141  In 1972, this canon became the 
                                                                
131Edward C. Brewer, III, Some Thoughts on the Process of Making Ethics Rules, 
Including How to Make the “Appearance of Impropriety” Disappear, 39 IDAHO L. REV. 321, 
323-24 (2003). 
132Id. at 324. 
133MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY Canon 9 (1981). 
134Peter W. Morgan, The Appearance of Propriety: Ethics Reform and the Blifil 
Paradoxes, 44 STAN. L. REV. 593, 595 (1992). 
135Brown v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 14 P.3d 1266, 1269 n.4 (Nev. 2000). 
136A measure of the relative importance to society of law as a profession is the number of 
Juris Doctor and/or Bachelor of Laws degrees in relation to the total number of first-
professional degrees.  Degrees in law comprised between roughly four and five out of every 
ten first-professional degrees awarded from the 1965-66 academic year to the 2000-01 
academic year.  Calculated at five-year intervals from 1965-66 to 2000-01 using data in the 
following sources:  Am. Bar Ass’n, Legal Education and Bar Admission Statistics, 1963-2005,  
available at http://www.abanet.org/legaled/statistics/le_bastats.html (last visited Nov. 7, 
2006); NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, DIGEST OF EDUCATION STATISTICS: 2003, at table 
249 (2004), available at http://nces.ed.gov/pubsearch/pubsinfo.asp?pubid=2005025 
[hereinafter DIGEST OF EDUCATION STATISTICS: 2003]. 
137See William T. Gallagher, Ideologies of Professionalism and the Politics of Self-
Regulation in the California State Bar, 22 PEPP. L. REV. 485, 619-621 (1995). 
138Brewer, supra note 131, at 324. 
139However, the Model Rules explicitly bar attorneys from publicly holding themselves 
out as admitted to practice in jurisdictions where they are not members of the Bar.  MODEL 
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.5(b) (2003).  The Rules, therefore, continue to prohibit 
appearances of one type. 
140Brewer, supra note 131, at 324-25. 
141AM. BAR ASS’N, OPINIONS OF THE COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS AND 
GRIEVANCES WITH THE CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS ANNOTATED AND THE CANONS OF 
JUDICIAL ETHICS ANNOTATED 29, 30 (1936).   
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basis of Canon 2 of the Model Code of Judicial Conduct.142  Canon 2 stated that “A 
Judge Shall Avoid Impropriety and the Appearance of Impropriety in All of the 
Judge’s Activities,” and the same wording was employed in the 1990 version of the 
Model Code of Judicial Conduct.143  The persistence over eight decades of the 
appearance-of-impropriety standard for judges is notable, for it is an implicit 
concession that appearances mold the public’s view of the institution of law.  Indeed, 
the importance to the institution of appearances does not seem to have been disputed 
in formulating the Model Rules.  The appearance-of-impropriety standard was 
abandoned in the Model Rules because it was thought to be incapable of consistent, 
non-invidious application rather than because appearances are irrelevant to the social 
standing of the institution of law.144 
Even though the most recent paradigm of ethical standards for attorneys 
promulgated by the American Bar Association does not include an explicit 
appearance-of-impropriety test, an indicator of the importance to society of 
appearances of ethical behavior is that, during the last two decades of the twentieth 
century, a widespread concern with appearances of unethical conduct existed in the 
United States.145  The concern cannot be dismissed as a sociological fortuity.  On the 
contrary, the concern may be unavoidable in a society that possesses a large 
population and a complex economy, because complete information about others is 
difficult to procure in such a setting.146  Accordingly, appearances of ethical conduct 
and appearances of unethical conduct by participants in a group are commonly 
understood to affect the degree of trust that prevails in the group.147  Moreover, 
appearances have been acknowledged as a factor that shapes the reputation of the 
judiciary and the police,148 and appearances thus affect the reputation of the 
institution of law itself.  Because trust and reputation—two social outputs that are 
critical to every group149—are influenced by appearances of ethical behavior and 
appearances of unethical behavior, American society places considerable emphasis 
on these appearances. 
To ascertain whether symbolic concepts and doctrines of law are reactions to 
societal conditions, I report below the results of a study that examined the use by 
states of the appearance-of-impropriety standard for the conduct of attorneys.  The 
Model Code, which incorporated the standard, and the Model Rules, which omitted 
                                                                
142LISA L. MILORD, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ABA JUDICIAL CODE 13 (1992). 
143AM. BAR ASS’N, ANNOTATED MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 29 (2004). 
144See Morgan, supra note 134, at 602-03, 616-17. 
145MORGAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 40, at 2-5. 
146See DENNIS F. THOMPSON, ETHICS IN CONGRESS 126 (1995) (“[A]ppearances are usually 
the only window that citizens have on official conduct.”). 
147E.g., Deborah Hellman, The Importance of Appearing Principled, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 
1108, 1126 (1995); Susan P. Shapiro, Bushwhacking the Ethical High Road: Conflict of 
Interest in the Practice of Law and Real Life, 28 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 87, 177 (2003). 
148E.g., In re Complaint of Fadeley, 802 P.2d 31, 40 (Ore. 1990) (judiciary); Auburn 
Police Union v. Carpenter, 8 F.3d 886, 902 (1st Cir. 1993) (law enforcement officers and 
associations). 
149Barnett, supra note 4, at 814-21, 825-27. 
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the standard, are simply proposals of the American Bar Association.  The standards 
of ethics that govern an attorney are set and enforced by the particular state in which 
the attorney practices.  Moreover, a state that declines to formulate its own standards 
but bases its ethical standards on the Model Code or Model Rules is not obligated to 
adopt verbatim the content of either; states have often modified the Model Code and 
Model Rules.150  In addition, the courts in a state through case law can alter the 
ethical standards of the state without revising the wording of the standards.  
Consequently, although by 2005 the Model Rules were in effect (albeit with 
modifications) in 45 states and the District of Columbia,151 neither the Model Rules 
nor the Model Code by themselves can be assumed to disclose accurately the current 
ethical standards that are applied to attorneys in a jurisdiction.  Rather, both the 
codified standards of a state and the opinions of the highest court of the state 
determine whether the appearance-of-impropriety standard is being used. 
B.  Research Design 
In mid-2005, I undertook a state-by-state review to ascertain whether, as of that 
time, the appearance-of-impropriety standard for attorneys either was an explicit 
provision of the written ethical requirements of the state or had been employed by 
the highest court of the state after the Model Rules (or modified version thereof) 
were adopted by the state.  Given that the purpose of my research was to identify 
societal properties that generally foster or hinder acceptance of the standard by 
states, I wanted to minimize the possibility that properties unique to a state could 
influence the findings, and I therefore did not include the two states (Alaska and 
Hawaii) that are geographically distant from the coterminous United States.  Of the 
remaining 48 states, four were excluded because I was unable to determine with 
certainty whether they currently utilized the appearance-of-impropriety standard.152  
The data analysis reported below is thus limited to 44 states.153 Twenty-six of the 
states were found to be applying the standard to attorneys as of mid-2005,154 and 
eighteen of the states were found not to be applying the standard to attorneys.155 
Four system-level properties were identified a priori as potential influences on 
whether the appearance-of-impropriety standard would be employed by a state.  The 
properties were cultural heterogeneity, population concentration, social system 
                                                                
150STEPHEN GILLERS, REGULATION OF LAWYERS:  PROBLEMS OF LAW AND ETHICS 4 (7th ed. 
2005). 
151Id. 
152The four states excluded for this reason were Connecticut, Maine, New Jersey, and 
Washington. 
153In order to confine the study to states, the District of Columbia was omitted from the 
statistical analysis. 
154The twenty-six states applying the standard were Arizona, Arkansas, California, 
Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, 
Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, 
Texas, Utah, Vermont, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. 
155The eighteen states not applying the standard were Alabama, Colorado, Delaware, 
Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Mexico, North Carolina, 
Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, and Virginia. 
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rationality, and societal stability.  The level of each property seemed, on logical 
grounds, to be capable of affecting the likelihood that a state would accept the 
standard, as I explain below.  The explanation is based on the assumption that, as to 
each property, all else is equal. 
Cultural heterogeneity.  Logically, a culture characterized by diversity could be 
inhospitable to explicit prohibitions on appearances of impropriety because the 
culture may lack a prerequisite for these prohibitions.  That prerequisite is a 
substantial body of common values, which may be needed for general agreement on 
conduct that is to be regarded as improper.  Without such agreement, bans on 
appearances of impropriety may not be adopted.  However, an alternative and 
opposing prediction is possible.  Specifically, a high level of cultural heterogeneity 
could facilitate the adoption of an explicit ban on appearances of impropriety and 
make such bans more frequent, because the ban can provide culturally diverse groups 
with a common focal point and thereby promote their commitment to the social 
system. 
Population concentration.  A high level of population concentration could increase 
the frequency of an express ban on appearances of impropriety.  Logic suggests that, 
when population density is high, appearances of improper conduct will be noticed by 
a larger percentage of the population.  On this reasoning, a densely populated society 
will benefit more than a sparsely populated society from an explicit ban on such 
appearances and is more likely to accept the appearance-of-impropriety standard.  
Alternatively, however, a high level of population concentration logically can reduce 
the need for, and the incidence of, explicit prohibitions on appearances of 
impropriety because informal, interpersonal pressures may be more common as 
population density rises.  In settings where numerous people are present, appearances 
of impropriety may be suppressed informally and an official proscription may be 
unnecessary. 
Social system rationality.  Logically, an express ban on appearances of impropriety 
is not required to the extent a population recognizes the importance of avoiding such 
appearances.  Such recognition presumably results from rationality.  A high level of 
rationality in a society,156 then, could reduce the need for the appearance-of-
impropriety standard and make the standard less likely.  On the other hand, the 
opposite could happen.  Specifically, insofar as rationality in a society fosters 
awareness of the social problems created by appearances of impropriety, explicit 
bans on these appearances could become more acceptable and, in turn, more 
frequent. 
Societal stability.  On logical grounds, a stable social system could require fewer 
symbols because commitment to the system is high, and law that explicitly bans 
appearances of impropriety could therefore be needed less in a stable than in an 
unstable system.  However, the opposite is logically possible, too.  A stable social 
system could have a larger number and variety of symbols than an unstable system 
because social values, including those that underlie the symbols, do not change as 
much and/or as often in a stable system.  Therefore, with greater societal stability, 
law may more often prohibit appearances of impropriety. 
                                                                
156The level of rationality in a society is probably an effect of the degree to which the 
society produces and uses sophisticated knowledge and disseminates that knowledge to its 
participants through the education institution. 
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In short, logic furnishes a basis for linking all four system-level properties to the 
appearance-of-impropriety standard; i.e., in principle, each property is capable of 
affecting the likelihood the standard will be present in a state.  However, as the 
preceding discussion reveals, a prediction cannot be made as to whether this 
likelihood is raised or lowered by growth or intensification of a given property. 
The necessity of relying on logic, and the inability to predict the direction of 
change in the likelihood of the appearance-of-impropriety standard, stem from the 
current, inadequate level of social science knowledge of law as an institution.  The 
study reported here attempts to contribute to a research-based sociological theory 
that deals with the existence and nature of the links between the system-level 
properties identified above, on the one hand, and doctrines of law, on the other.  If a 
society is a system—i.e., if the components of society do not operate haphazardly—
the symbols of law do not develop fortuitously, and a relationship can be expected to 
exist between one or more of the properties discussed above and the appearance-of-
impropriety standard for attorneys. 
In order to ascertain the relationship, if any, between the properties and the 
adoption by states of the appearance-of-impropriety standard, the properties must be 
empirically measured.  Because the properties are potential building blocks for a 
sociological theory of law, their conceptualization is necessarily abstract, and each 
property must be represented in the statistical analysis by a variable that 
quantitatively and accurately captures the property.  Table 1 provides descriptions, as 
well as the mnemonic labels, of the variables that were utilized in the regression 
model as indicators of the properties.  The indicator variable corresponding to each 
property was as follows: 
 
System-level property Indicator (mnemonic label) 
 
Cultural heterogeneity 
 
FOREIGNPOP 
Population concentration METROPOP 
Social system rationality COLLEGERATE 
Societal stability CRIMERATE 
 
For cultural heterogeneity in a state, an obvious indicator is the percentage of the 
population of the state that was born outside the United States, and for population 
concentration in a state, an obvious indicator is the percentage of inhabitants of the 
state who reside in a metropolitan area.  Accordingly, these indicators need no 
justification.  For societal stability in a state, the indicator employed is the state 
crime rate, because crime reduces interpersonal contacts157 and hence impairs the 
ability of a social system to function smoothly.  For social system rationality in a 
state, the indicator is the percentage of adults who were enrolled in college (either 
part-time or full-time) in the state.158  While this indicator may not seem useful on its 
                                                                
157Allen E. Liska & Barbara D. Warner, Functions of Crime: A Paradoxical Process, 96 
AM. J. SOC. 1441, 1460-61 (1991). 
158The college enrollment rate for each state was calculated for this study from the sources 
of data for COLLEGERATE identified in note 160 infra.  The denominator for the calculation was 
the number of inhabitants of each state in 1980 who were at least 18 years old; the numerator 
was the number of individuals (male and female) who were enrolled in college in the state in 
Fall 1980.  Some enrollees, however, were younger than 18.  While data on the age 
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face, an analysis of data for males 14 to 24 years old concluded that differences 
between states in proportions attending college are partly attributable to state 
differences in rationality.159 
 
Table 1.  Variables in Regression Model160 
 
Variable 
(mnemonic label) 
 
Description of variable 
   APPEARIMPROP 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Each state was coded 0 or 1.  0 = the appearance-of-
impropriety standard is not explicit in the enumerated 
ethical standards for lawyer conduct that are in force in 
the state and has not been used by the highest court of the 
state while the current enumerated standards have been in 
force; 1 = the appearance-of-impropriety standard is 
explicit in the enumerated ethical standards for lawyer 
conduct that are in force in the state or, if not explicit in 
the current enumerated standards, has been used by the 
highest court of the state while the current enumerated 
standards have been in force. 
                                                          
distribution of college students was not available for each state, approximately two percent of 
all college students nationally in 1980 were under 18 years of age.  Computed from NAT’L 
CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, DIGEST OF EDUCATION STATISTICS: 1994, at table 171 (1994), 
available at http://nces.ed.gov/pubsearch/pubsinfo.asp?pubid=94115 [hereinafter DIGEST OF 
EDUCATION STATISTICS: 1994].  On average, therefore, the state college enrollment rates in this 
study differ slightly from the actual percentages of the adult populations of the states that were 
enrolled in college. 
159Michael B. Tannen, The Investment Motive for Attending College, 31 INDUS. & LAB. 
REL. REV. 489 (1978). 
160The data for the variables were obtained or computed from the following sources: 
APPEARIMPROP:  Search of Lexis databases conducted by the author in mid-2005.   
COLLEGERATE:  DIGEST OF EDUCATION STATISTICS: 1994, supra note 158, at table 186; 
U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, COUNTY AND CITY DATA BOOK: 1994, at table A (12th ed. 1994); 
U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATE AND METROPOLITAN AREA DATA BOOK: 1997-98, at table 
A-3 (5th ed. 1998). 
CRIMERATE:  U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS: CRIME IN THE UNITED 
STATES, at table 3 (1981); U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE 
UNITED STATES: 1982-83, at table 32 (103rd ed. 1982). 
FOREIGNPOP:  Campbell J. Gibson & Emily Lennon, U.S. Census Bureau, Historical 
Census Statistics on the Foreign-born Population of the United States: 1850-1990 (Feb. 1999), 
at table 13:  Nativity of the Population, for Regions, Divisions, and States: 1850 to 1990, 
http://www.census.gov/population/www/documentation/twps0029/twps0029.html (last visited 
Nov. 7, 2006). 
METROPOP:  U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 
1993, at table 41 (113th ed. 1993), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/www/ 
abs/statab1951-1994.htm [hereinafter STATISTICAL ABSTRACT: 1993]. 
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    COLLEGERATE 
 
 
Persons enrolled (part-time or full-time) in college in each 
state in Fall 1980 as a percentage of the population age 18 
or older in the state. 
    CRIMERATE 
 
 
 
 
The number of Crime Index crimes in each state in 1980 
per 1000 state residents who were at least 15 years of age.  
Crime Index crimes are murder and non-negligent 
manslaughter, forcible rape, robbery, aggravated assault, 
burglary, larceny-theft, and motor-vehicle theft. 
   
     FOREIGNPOP 
 
 
The percentage of all inhabitants of each state in 1980 
who were born outside the United States. 
 
     METROPOP 
 
 
The percentage of all inhabitants of each state in 1980 
who resided in a “metropolitan area,” as defined by the 
U.S. Census Bureau.  A “metropolitan area” encompassed 
(i) a core area that had a substantial population and (ii) 
communities adjoining the core that were integrated, 
economically as well as socially, with the core.  Every 
metropolitan area included either: 
 At least one city with a population of not less than 
50,000; or 
 Both (i) an urbanized area, as determined by Census 
Bureau criteria, with a population of not less than 
50,000 and (ii) a total metropolitan area population 
of not less than 100,000 (75,000 in New 
England).161 
 
For every indicator variable, data were obtained on each of the 44 states that were 
included in the study.  The variables are measured as of 1980.  The year 1980 was 
chosen for two reasons.  First, data on all of the indicator variables were available for 
that year.162  Second, 1980 preceded the introduction of the Model Rules163, and by 
                                                                
161STATISTICAL ABSTRACT: 1993, supra note 160, at 916-17. 
162An effort was made to include, as an indicator of social system stability, the state 
divorce and annulment rate in 1980, i.e., the number of divorces and annulments granted in 
1980 in each state per 1000 inhabitants who were at least 15 years of age.  However, data on 
divorces and annulments in 1980 were incomplete for one of the 44 states.  Sally C. Clarke, 
Nat’l Ctr. for Health Statistics, Advance Report of Final Divorce Statistics, 1989 and 1990, 
MONTHLY VITAL STATISTICS REPORT, March 22, 1995, 11, table 2, available at 
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/mardiv.htm.  As a result, the divorce-annulment rate was omitted 
from the statistical analysis.  For the 43 states for which the divorce-annulment rate in 1980 
was determinable, a zero-order product-moment correlation coefficient of 0.4347 existed 
between the divorce-annulment rate and the crime rate (denominated CRIMERATE in Table 1).  
Therefore, approximately one-fifth of the variation in each rate is linked to variation in the 
other (r2 = (.4347)2 = .189 x 100 = 18.9%), and although the two rates are to some extent 
overlapping indicators of societal stability, they are for the most part independent. 
163The Model Rules were promulgated in 1982.  Brewer, supra note 131, at 324-25. 
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1980 all of the 44 states in the study had endorsed the appearance-of-impropriety 
standard for attorneys.164  Since the Model Rules rejected the standard, 1980 is a 
useful temporal point (i) for marking the start of the period in history during which 
many states abandoned the standard and (ii) for ascertaining whether and how the 
four system-level properties predict state retention or rejection of the standard. 
A final but important matter involving the research design requires discussion.  
The findings of the study do not furnish a basis for definitive conclusions regarding 
the impact of the properties.  Caution in interpreting the findings is necessary for at 
least two reasons.  First, the system-level properties under consideration are poorly 
understood because they have not been extensively researched by social scientists.  
Future research may reveal that each property possesses multiple aspects and that 
each aspect requires a different indicator.  Accordingly, the selection of indicator 
variables was grounded on logic and supposition, not substantial empirical research, 
and the indicator variable chosen for a property may not fully capture the property.  
Second, the relationship of the four properties to the presence or absence of the 
appearance-of-impropriety standard was not assessed with repeated and regular (e.g., 
annual) measures of the properties over time.  Such data, especially when they cover 
both points in time prior and points in time subsequent to the occurrence or 
disappearance of the effect being investigated, are the most appropriate for 
identifying causal relationships that involve state-level phenomena.165 
C.  Data Analysis 
The preceding limitations of the research design did not directly affect the data 
analysis, but another aspect of the study did.  Specifically, the number of 
observations (i.e., states) reduced the precision with which the indicator variables 
could be measured in analyzing the data.  Because there were a total of 44 
observations, many cells had no observations—i.e., a frequency of zero—when 
APPEARIMPROP was cross-tabulated with the exact percentage or rate of an indicator 
variable for a state, i.e., when the measures of the indicator variables were 
continuous.  However, the data analysis technique that the study employed — viz., 
maximum-likelihood logistic regression—is problematic when there are cells with 
                                                                
164Canon 9 of the Model Code of Professional Responsibility, which was issued by the 
ABA in 1969, provided that “a lawyer should avoid even the appearance of impropriety.”  
MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY Canon 9 (1980);  Brewer, supra note 131, at 324. By 
1980, according to a survey by the ABA, Canon 9 had been adopted in all states with the 
possible exception of California, Delaware, Georgia, Maine, Montana, and New Mexico.  
ABA NAT’L CTR. FOR PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY, CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY BY 
STATE x (1980).  Of these six states, Maine was not included in the data.  See, supra, note 152.  
The remaining five states had adopted, no later than 1980, either Canon 9 or a common-law 
appearance-of-impropriety standard for attorneys.  Comden v. Superior Court, 576 P.2d 971, 
973 (Cal. 1978) (California); DEL. CODE ANN., vol. 16, at 562, 589 (1974) (Canon 9 adopted 
in 1971) (Delaware); GA. CODE ANN. tit. 9 App. Rule 3-109 (Harrison 1973) (Canon 9 in 
effect in 1973) (Georgia);  In re Estate of Sauter, 615 P.2d 875, 878 (Mont. 1980) (Montana); 
John H. Clough, Federalism: The Imprecise Calculus of Dual Sovereignty, 35 J. MARSHALL L. 
REV. 1, 36 n.209 (2001) (finding that Canon 9 was adopted by the Supreme Court of New 
Mexico in 1974) (New Mexico). 
165Shepherd, supra note 65, at 213-14. 
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zero observations.166  As a result, three categories with approximately equal numbers 
of observations (i.e., equal numbers of states) were created for each indicator 
variable.  When APPEARIMPROP was tabulated by the categories of each indicator 
variable, no cell in any of the resulting six-cell tables had fewer than four 
observations (states). 
Table 2 presents the range of percentages or rates for each of the three categories 
of each of the indicator variables.  The table also shows the number of states in every 
category. 
 
Table 2.  Range of Percentages or Rates, and Number of States,  
in Categories of the Indicator Variables 
 
 
Range of percentages or rates,  
and number of states, by category 
 
 
 
 
   Variable Low Medium High 
 
COLLEGERATE 
 
4.8 to 6.4 
N = 14 
6.5 to 7.4 
N = 15 
7.6 to 10.6 
N = 15 
 
CRIMERATE 
 
32.9 to 62.1 
N = 15 
64.3 to 74.4 
N = 15 
76.2 to 113.2 
N = 14 
 
FOREIGNPOP 
 
0.9 to 1.7 
N = 12 
1.9 to 3.5 
N = 16 
3.9 to 15.1 
N = 16 
 
METROPOP 
 
24.0 to 51.8 
N = 14 
57.0 to 77.2 
N = 15 
80.5 to 96.8 
N = 15 
                                                                
166DAVID W. HOSMER & STANLEY LEMESHOW, APPLIED LOGISTIC REGRESSION 135-38 (2d 
ed. 2000). 
In principle, each indicator variable in the instant study is measured with data that 
constitute a ratio scale, and because such a measure is continuous, the data for each indicator 
variable are usable in logistic regression without being collapsed into a few categories.  Id. at 
136.  In practice, however, the data for the indicator variables are more prudently treated as 
ordinal scales, because on the variables, the states tended to concentrate at certain numerical 
values rather than to be spread evenly across the range of values observed.  For example, the 
distributions of three of the four indicator variables were at least as peaked as the normal 
distribution, and thus were far from flat.  The kurtosis coefficient for the individual 
(uncollapsed) values of each indicator variable was 3.3 for COLLEGERATE, 2.9 for CRIMERATE, 
6.1 for FOREIGNPOP, and 2.0 for METROPOP.  The kurtosis coefficient for the normal 
distribution is 3.0.  STATA CORP., 4 STATA REFERENCE MANUAL: RELEASE 8, at 150 (2003). 
The concentration of states at particular numerical values on an indicator variable is 
probably not due to the relatively small number of cases supplying the data but, rather, is 
likely to inhere in the nature of social systems.  To operate effectively, a social system 
probably requires that important variables be present in certain amounts or at certain levels; 
thus, it is likely that a social system changes when thresholds are reached on one or more 
causal variables.  If so, in most social science research on states, a relatively few categories 
seem to be the most appropriate way to measure an independent variable characterized by 
gradations in magnitude. 
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The number of states (observations) in the study necessitates consideration of a 
further question.  Researchers have devoted scant attention to the question of the 
minimum number of observations needed for the accurate calculation of statistical 
significance by maximum-likelihood logistic regression,167 and hence the number is 
uncertain.  Nevertheless, some guidelines are available, and they suggest that the 
number of observations in the instant study is substantially fewer than the number 
that is required168 to generate reliable, unbiased estimates of the characteristics of a 
larger universe.169  With these guidelines, accordingly, there is no support for using 
tests of statistical significance in the study. 
If statistical significance cannot be computed accurately, do the odds ratios 
estimated by logistic regression for the current data have any utility?  The answer is 
that they do, because the odds ratios for the four indicator variables can stand on 
their own.  Indeed, little if anything has been lost in the instant study from the 
inability to know the statistical significance of the odds ratios.  To understand why, 
the role in research of tests of statistical significance needs to be explained.  As I 
hope to convey in the explanation that follows, measures of statistical significance 
are unnecessary in the instant study even though they are justifiable in much, if not 
most, quantitative social science research.  The odds ratios themselves can be the 
basis for identifying relationships to the appearance-of-impropriety standard of the 
system-level properties posited as antecedents of the standard. 
The goal of the social and behavioral sciences is to ascertain conditions in and 
characteristics of populations (i.e., universes) of human beings or human 
organizations.  However, data cannot be acquired from all of the members of most 
populations due to the economic cost and/or time that would be expended.  As a 
result, a sample must typically be drawn from the population that is under 
investigation, and conclusions about the population must be reached from data 
supplied by the sample.  The function of tests of statistical significance is to allow 
such data to be employed to reach one type of conclusion regarding the population 
with knowledge of the likelihood that the conclusion is wrong.  Specifically, a test of 
significance whose assumptions (e.g., as to sampling procedure) are satisfied 
                                                                
167Id., at 339. 
168A minimum of 100 observations has been suggested for tests of significance calculated 
by maximum-likelihood logistic regression.  J. SCOTT LONG, REGRESSION MODELS FOR 
CATEGORICAL AND LIMITED DEPENDENT VARIABLES 53-54 (1997).  The present study, of 
course, has just 44 observations. 
The conclusion that the study lacked sufficient observations for tests of statistical 
significance is also reached using the approach proposed by HOSMER & LEMESHOW, supra 
note 166, at 346-47, for maximum-likelihood logistic regression.  The appearance-of-
impropriety standard is employed by twenty-six states and not employed by eighteen.  See 
supra  notes 154-55.  Since the least-frequent outcome is eighteen, the regression model in the 
instant study would be limited to just a single indicator variable (parameter) under the 
Hosmer-Lemeshow approach, and the inclusion of four such variables is excessive.  The 
number of states with the least-frequent outcome, of course, is partly a function of the total 
number of states. 
169Peter Peduzzi et al., A Simulation Study of the Number of Events per Variable in 
Logistic Regression Analysis, 49 J. CLINICAL EPIDEMIOLOGY 1373 (1996). 
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identifies the probability of error when deciding to reject the “null hypothesis”—the 
hypothesis that, in the population, no relationship exists between two variables or no 
difference exists between two groups on a particular attribute.  In what percentage of 
samples from the population would a particular relationship between variables or a 
particular difference between groups be found if there is actually no relationship or 
no difference in the population, i.e., if the null hypothesis correctly portrays the 
population?  The answer is the level of statistical significance.  The level of 
statistical significance thus discloses the probability of erring when the null 
hypothesis is rejected on the basis of data garnered from a relatively small number of 
members of a population who have been selected with a probability (e.g., random) 
sampling procedure. 
In short, information on the statistical significance of an odds ratio presupposes 
that a sample has furnished the data from which the odds ratio and its statistical 
significance have been estimated.  If the data used in a study to compute the odds 
ratio come from the entire universe of interest, however, statistical significance is 
irrelevant.  That is the situation in the instant study.  The universe for the study is the 
states in the continental United States whose acceptance or nonacceptance of the 
appearance-of-impropriety standard for attorneys could be determined as of 2005.  
Because the data for the study include all states in the continental United States that 
had an ascertainable position on the standard in 2005, the data do not result from 
sampling, and a test of statistical significance is inappropriate. 
However, skepticism of conclusions—especially conclusions regarding causal 
relationships—is not eliminated simply because the data underlying the conclusions 
cover the entire universe under investigation.  While estimates of statistical 
significance (even if based on an adequate number of observations) contribute little 
or nothing to the instant study,170 the study has potentially major limitations that arise 
from the two problems discussed in the last paragraph of part IV-B supra of this 
article, namely, possible defects in the measurement of the system-level properties 
posited as antecedents of the appearance-of-impropriety standard and the lack of 
time-series data on the indicator variables for these properties. 
With this background, I turn to the results of the data analysis.171  Table 3 
presents the odds ratios from the regression of the appearance-of-impropriety 
standard (APPEARIMPROP) on the four indicator variables.  In addition, the table 
supplies the two-tailed level of statistical significance of the odds ratios for readers 
who prefer to ground decisions regarding a regression model on this information. 
                                                                
170Tests of statistical significance, even though common in social science research, have 
fundamental limitations that are often unrecognized or ignored, and use of the tests may be 
unjustified even for samples containing an adequate number of observations.  LANCELOT 
HOGBEN, STATISTICAL THEORY: THE RELATIONSHIP OF PROBABILITY, CREDIBILITY AND ERROR 
332-44 (1957). 
171All analyses of the data in this study were conducted with Stata (Release 8.2).  The 
Stata command LOGISTIC generated the results in table 3 as well as the results in table 4. 
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Table 3.  Odds Ratios and Two-tailed Significance Levels  
for Regression of APPEARIMPROP on Indicator Variables: 44 States 
 
                          Standard 
    Variable Odds ratio Error z p >z 
 
COLLEGERATE 
 
0.730 .252 -0.91 0.360 
 
CRIMERATE 
 
1.004 .023 0.16 0.873 
 
FOREIGNPOP 
 
1.491 .616 0.97 0.334 
 
METROPOP 
 
0.976 .018 -1.32 0.186 
 
Regression model  
 
Number of observations 
 
=  44 
Log likelihood =  -28.504 
Likelihood ratio chi-squared(4) =  2.53 
Probability > chi-square =  0.640 
Pseudo R2 (McFadden’s R2)       =  0.042 
 
 
Inherent in the odds ratios reported in table 3 are a number of assumptions 
regarding the statistical attributes of the data, and the accuracy of these assumptions 
must be probed before the odds ratios are used to draw conclusions regarding 
relationships between the indicator variables and APPEARIMPROP.  The first 
assumption is that outliers did not affect the odds ratios.  Outliers are cases (here, 
states) characterized by a substantial disparity between the actual (i.e., observed) 
outcome on the dependent variable (APPEARIMPROP) and the outcome predicted by 
the regression equation.  Cook’s Statistic, a measure used to identify influential 
outliers,172 was 0.3 or higher for twenty-one states.173  Consequently, the odds ratios 
for the regression model in table 3 were re-estimated by omitting each of these states 
                                                                
172J. SCOTT LONG & JEREMY FREESE, REGRESSION MODELS FOR CATEGORICAL DEPENDENT 
VARIABLES USING STATA 128 (rev. ed. 2003). 
173One recommendation that has been made by statisticians is to treat Cook’s Statistic as 
generally small in magnitude when it is less than 1.0.  HOSMER & LEMESHOW, supra note 166, 
at 180.  Another recommendation is to regard Cook’s statistic as small when it is less than the 
result obtained from dividing the number 2 by the square root of the number of observations 
— here, 2/√44 = 0.3.  DAVID A. BELSLEY ET AL., REGRESSION DIAGNOSTICS 28 (2004).  As is 
evident from the different recommendations, there are no generally accepted quantitative 
criteria for identifying outliers whose influence may be undermining regression results; the 
process of determining such influence is acknowledged to be subjective.  HOSMER & 
LEMESHOW, supra note 166, at 176; LONG & FREESE, supra note 172, at 126. 
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one at a time.  When the odds ratios from the resulting twenty-one regression 
equations (each based on 43 states) were compared to the odds ratios in table 3, the 
exclusion of New Mexico proved notable.  Moreover, New Mexico had the largest 
standardized residual of the 44 states in the study.  Accordingly, New Mexico was 
omitted from the data analysis, and APPEARIMPROP was regressed on the indicator 
variables using 43 states.  The results from the regression equation without New 
Mexico are reported in table 4. 
 
 
Table 4.  Odds Ratios and Two-tailed Significance Levels for Regression of 
APPEARIMPROP on Indicator Variables: 43 States 
 
                          Standard 
    
Variable Odds ratio Error z p >z 
 
COLLEGERATE 
 
0.623 .235 -1.25 0.210 
 
CRIMERATE 
 
1.013 .025 0.54 0.590 
 
FOREIGNPOP 
 
2.089 .982 1.57 0.117 
 
METROPOP 
 
0.955 .022 -2.01 0.045 
 
Regression model  
 
Number of observations 
 
=  43 
Log likelihood =  -25.973 
Likelihood ratio chi-squared(4) =  5.77 
Probability > chi-square =  0.217 
Pseudo R2 (McFadden’s R2)       =  0.100 
 
The second assumption requiring examination prior to accepting the results in 
table 3 and/or table 4 is that variation in one independent variable in the regression 
model does not correspond exactly to variation in any other independent variable.  
The assumption is important because a correlation (i.e., collinearity) between two 
independent variables, if sufficiently strong, can prevent multiple regression from 
computing a reliable estimate of the odds ratio and coefficient for either of these 
independent variables.  Multiple regression supplies an estimate of the change in the 
dependent variable (denominated Y) that is associated with a unit of change in a 
particular independent variable (X1), but in order to estimate accurately the change in 
the dependent variable that is attributable to that independent variable (X1) rather 
than to another independent variable (X2), multiple regression must be able to 
remove the statistical influence of the latter independent variable (X2).  If a strong 
relationship exists between independent variables X1 and X2, however, multiple 
regression may be unable to separate the change in the dependent variable 
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attributable to independent variable X1 from the change in the dependent variable 
attributable to independent variable X2.  When two independent variables are highly 
correlated with each other, in short, multiple regression may not generate reliable 
estimates of the change that takes place in the dependent variable when a unit of 
change occurs in either of these correlated independent variables.174 
A reason to believe that collinearity might preclude the reliable estimation of 
odds ratios in the instant study is found in the nontrivial zero-order rank correlation 
coefficient (Spearman’s rho) for the relationships between pairs of the independent 
variables.  The independent variables in tables 3 and 4 are the indicator variables for 
the system-level properties that have been proposed as possible antecedents of the 
appearance-of-impropriety standard (the dependent variable).  In the 44-state data set 
and in the 43-state data set, the smallest rank correlation coefficient was 0.28.  In the 
44-state data set, four of the six rank correlation coefficients were 0.57 or higher; in 
the 43-state data set, four of the six coefficients were 0.60 or higher.  However, the 
logistic regression program employed in the data analysis automatically notifies the 
investigator when an unacceptable level of collinearity is present,175 and it did not do 
so for the results reported either in table 3 or in table 4.176  Accordingly, collinearity 
was evidently not a problem, and the second assumption was accepted. 
I turn now to the third assumption of the regression model that needs to be tested.  
The assumption is that the nature and strength of the relationship between each 
independent variable and the dependent variable is not conditional on any other 
independent variable.  If the assumption is incorrect, the relationship of independent 
variable X1 to the dependent variable differs across the levels or categories of 
independent variable X2.177  Such a conditional relationship, in statistical 
terminology, involves “interaction” between X1 and X2.  Interaction can occur when 
the two independent variables are related to each another.  As pointed out above in 
the discussion of collinearity, the four indicator (independent) variables in the instant 
study were characterized by nontrivial rank correlation coefficients in their 
relationships to one another.  Accordingly, some of the indicator variables may 
interact, and the assumption that no interaction is present may be incorrect. 
To ascertain interaction between independent variables in a data set, any pair of 
the independent variables can be used to create a new variable (“interaction 
variable”) that will serve as an additional independent variable.  In the instant study, 
the numerical values of an interaction variable can be obtained by multiplying, for 
each state, the numerical values that start the range of the categories in which the 
state falls on the two indicator variables comprising the interaction variable.178  
However, if the objective of research is to build theory, the choice of independent 
                                                                
174WILLIAM D. BERRY, UNDERSTANDING REGRESSION ASSUMPTIONS 24-27 (1993). 
175STATA CORP., 2 STATA BASE REFERENCE MANUAL: RELEASE 8, at 331 (2003) 
[hereinafter 2 STATA MANUAL]. 
176Excessive collinearity is evidenced by very large standard errors.  BERRY, supra note 
174, at 27; HOSMER & LEMESHOW, supra note 166, at 141.  Visual inspection of table 3 and 
table 4 indicates that the standard errors are not abnormal in size. 
177JAMES JACCARD & ROBERT TURRISI, INTERACTION EFFECTS IN MULTIPLE REGRESSION 3 
(2d ed. 2003). 
178The numerical values for the categories are given in table 2. 
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variables to examine for potential interaction should be based on existing or 
proposed theory.  That is, theory on a subject should guide the selection of the 
independent variables that can be expected to interact and whose interaction should 
be investigated.179  Current macrosociological theory addresses two of the 
independent variables in the instant study.  Specifically, theory suggests that cultural 
heterogeneity and population density reinforce one another.180  Thus, there is reason 
to include in the regression model the interaction variable from these properties and 
to ascertain whether this interaction variable is related to APPEARIMPROP.  If the 
interaction variable is related to APPEARIMPROP, the relationship to APPEARIMPROP of 
each of its component variables is conditional on the other.181 
Differences between states in the level of cultural heterogeneity are captured by 
FOREIGNPOP, and differences between states in population density are captured by 
METROPOP.  Consequently, the numerical values that begin the range of the 
categories of FOREIGNPOP and of METROPOP for each state were multiplied to 
generate a new variable, and this interaction variable was included as an independent 
variable in a regression equation together with the original four independent 
(indicator) variables.  The equation was applied to the data set that contained all 44 
states and to the data set that contained 43 states (i.e., the data set omitting New 
Mexico).  The odds ratios for the interaction variable in both data sets departed no 
more than ±.012 from 1.000 and thus furnished no evidence that there was a 
relationship between the interaction variable and APPEARIMPROP—or at least a 
relationship of any practical utility.182  Moreover, because the interaction variable 
was created from ordinal-level components that deviated considerably from interval-
level measures, inclusion of the interaction variable in the regression equation is 
dubious.183  As a result, the interaction variable is not considered further. 
                                                                
179See JAMES JACCARD, INTERACTION EFFECTS IN FACTORIAL ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE 5 
(1998); BERRY, supra note 174, at 30-31. 
180Claude S. Fischer, The Subcultural Theory of Urbanism: A Twentieth-Year Assessment, 
101 AM. J. SOC. 543, 552 (1995). 
Other potential interactions in the instant study lack a theoretical foundation and, 
therefore, are not considered.  The possibility of an interaction between CRIMERATE and 
METROPOP nevertheless deserves mention, because urban areas are evidently characterized by 
higher rates of crime overall than are rural locations.  Edward L. Glaeser & Bruce Sacerdote, 
Why Is There More Crime in Cities?, 107 J. POL. ECON. S225 (1999).  Certain types of major 
crime, however, are not more frequent in urban settings.  Fischer, supra, at 560-65.  Since 
urban size is not related to all types of serious crime, the role of the former in the latter is 
unclear, and the interaction variable based on CRIMERATE and METROPOP was omitted from the 
regression model. 
181JACCARD & TURRISI, supra note 177, at 18-20. 
182In sample surveys, interactions—especially interactions of large magnitude—are 
infrequently found because of the distributions of the independent variables that comprise the 
interaction variables.  Gary H. McClelland & Charles M. Judd, Statistical Difficulties of 
Detecting Interactions and Moderator Effects, 114 PSYCHOL. BULL. 376, 377, 386 (1993). 
183JACCARD & TURRISI, supra note 177, at 70-72. 
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D.  Discussion of Findings 
How well did the regression model in table 3 and in table 4 predict whether the 
appearance-of-impropriety standard for attorneys is present in a state?  The model as 
a whole—i.e., all four indicator variables together—accurately predicted the 
presence or absence of the standard in 59% of the states in table 3 and in 60% of the 
states in table 4.184  If the predictions had been made randomly, 50.0% of the states 
would have been correctly identified.  Consequently, the overall model somewhat 
aids prediction.  However, the benefit of the model was not uniform.  Specifically, 
the model was very accurate in predicting the states that adopted the standard, but its 
accuracy was quite poor in identifying the states that rejected the standard.185 
If the goal of research is to build theory, the most important question confronting 
an investigator is not the regression model per se but the particular independent 
variables in the model.186  Theory is constructed from independent variables that are 
related to the dependent variable, and advances in theory depend on uncovering these 
variables.  Thus, I turn to the question of whether and how each independent variable 
in the regression model under consideration is related to state differences in the 
presence/absence of the appearance-of-impropriety standard.  Since the odds ratios in 
tables 3 and 4 reveal a substantial relationship to the standard on the part of two 
indicator variables—viz., COLLEGERATE and FOREIGNPOP—these variables merit 
further examination.  In discussing them, an explanation of three statistical 
concepts—probability, odds, and odds ratio—will be helpful. 
The probability of occurrence of a phenomenon is the proportion of the 
combined number of occurrences and nonoccurrences that are occurrences, while the 
probability of nonoccurrence of a phenomenon is the proportion of the combined 
number of occurrences and nonoccurrences that are nonoccurrences.  In the instant 
data, the probability that the appearance-of-impropriety standard for attorneys was 
being used in a state is calculated through the division of 26, the number of states 
employing the standard, by 44, the total number of states.  Thus, the probability of 
occurrence of the standard was 26/44 = .59.  Conversely, the probability that the 
standard was not being used in a state is calculated through the division of 18, the 
number of states not employing the standard, by 44.  The probability of 
nonoccurrence, therefore, is 18/44 = .41. 
The probability of a phenomenon, however, differs from the odds of the 
phenomenon.  When the probability of occurrence of a phenomenon is divided by 
the probability of its nonoccurrence, the result is the odds of occurrence, and when 
the probability of nonoccurrence of a phenomenon is divided by the probability of 
occurrence, the result is the odds of nonoccurrence.  In the instant data, the odds that 
the appearance-of-impropriety standard for attorneys was being employed in a state 
                                                                
184The calculation was performed by the Stata command LSTAT.  2 STATA MANUAL, supra 
note 175, at 309.  The calculation used the default predicted probability of the dependent 
variable, namely, ≥ 0.5.  Id. at 299.  The LSTAT output includes the percentages for the 
“sensitivity” and the “specificity” of the model, which terms are defined in id. at 323. 
185Among the states having the standard, the percentage of correct predictions was 88% 
for the states in table 3 and 81% for the states in table 4.  Among the states not having the 
standard, the percentage of correct predictions was 17% for the states in table 3 and 29% for 
the states in table 4. 
186LONG & FREESE, supra note 172, at 88. 
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is the ratio of .59 (the probability of occurrence) to .41 (the probability of 
nonoccurrence), while the odds that a state was not employing the standard is the 
ratio of .41 to .59.  Thus, the odds that a state was utilizing the standard is .59/.41 = 
1.44 (alternatively expressed as 1.44 to 1), while the odds that a state was not 
utilizing the standard is .41/.59 = 0.69 (or 0.69 to 1). 
The third statistical concept is the odds ratio, i.e., a ratio of two odds.  The 
numerator in the odds ratio in logistic regression is the odds of the dependent 
variable for a category of the independent variable; the denominator is the odds of 
the dependent variable for a different category of the same independent variable, 
namely, the category that, in terms of numerical score, is immediately below the 
category used in the numerator.  In the instant study, the odds ratio for an indicator 
(independent) variable is the ratio of the odds that the appearance-of-impropriety 
standard was being used by a state in one category of the indicator variable relative 
to the odds that the standard was being used by a state in the category with the next-
lower score.  (The categories of each of the indicator variables are given in table 2.)  
Thus, the odds ratio for an independent variable specifies the factor by which the 
odds of the dependent variable are multiplied when the independent variable 
increases by one category,187 and the independent variable is related to the dependent 
variable to the degree that its odds ratio deviates from 1.000. 
The odds ratios in tables 3 and 4 indicate that relationships of practical 
importance existed between COLLEGERATE and FOREIGNPOP, on the one hand, and 
APPEARIMPROP, on the other, but the relationships of COLLEGERATE and FOREIGNPOP 
to APPEARIMPROP are weaker in table 3 than in table 4.  In order to portray the 
magnitude of the relationships conservatively, the discussion below will confine 
itself to the odds ratios in table 3. 
With the other independent variables held constant, the odds that the appearance-
of-impropriety standard was used in a state (i) declined by a factor of 0.730 for each 
category increase in the percentage of the adult population in the state attending 
college, and (ii) rose by a factor of 1.491 for each category increase in the percentage 
of the population in the state that was born outside the United States.  That is, 
removing the effects of the other independent variables, the odds of employing the 
standard are multiplied by 0.730 when a state moves up one category in college 
attendance and by 1.491 when a state moves up one category in foreign-born 
population.  The two variables thus work in opposite directions with regard to 
whether a state uses the appearance-of-impropriety standard.  Expressed in 
percentages, each rise in category of college attendance was associated with a 27% 
reduction, and each rise in category of foreign-born population was associated with a 
49% increase, in the odds that the standard was present in a state.188 
The percentage changes (-27% and +49%) for the indicator variables suggest that 
cultural heterogeneity had a somewhat stronger relationship to the appearance-of-
impropriety standard than did social system rationality.  This conclusion is buttressed 
by standardized regression coefficients for the indicator variables.189  For the model 
                                                                
187FRED C. PAMPEL, LOGISTIC REGRESSION 11-13, 36-37 (2000). 
188Factor changes (here, 0.730 and 1.491) are translated into percentages by subtracting 
1.000 from each factor change and multiplying the remainders by 100. 
189Each coefficient was standardized on the variance of both the dependent variable and 
the independent variable.  The “fully standardized” coefficients were obtained from the 
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in table 3, the standardized coefficients were –0.32 for COLLEGERATE and +0.44 for 
FOREIGNPOP.190 
Part IV of the instant article is based on the thesis that research can identify the 
system-level properties that predict the use of symbols of law, and the discussion to 
this point has therefore focused on whether the appearance-of-impropriety standard 
was present in states.  However, the converse of the above approach merits 
consideration, too.  Specifically, what is the relationship of the independent variables 
to whether the standard was absent from states?  The answer to the question is 
obtained from the inverse of each odds ratio in table 3, and is 1.371 for 
COLLEGERATE and 0.671 for FOREIGNPOP.191  Thus, the odds of the standard being 
discontinued by a state are multiplied by a factor of 1.371 for each category increase 
in college attendance and by a factor of 0.671 for each category increase in foreign-
born population.  The (rounded) percentages corresponding to these odds ratios are, 
respectively, 37% and –33%.192 
In sum, the data analysis suggests that the appearance-of-impropriety standard for 
attorneys is not a randomly occurring doctrine of law and that the presence or 
absence of the standard is tied to specific system-level properties.  Although 
indicators rather than direct measures of hypothesized antecedents were employed in 
the data analysis, social system rationality and cultural heterogeneity evidently 
contribute to whether a state adopts or rejects the standard.  This conclusion is 
buttressed by trends over time (discussed in Part V below) in indicators of social 
system rationality and cultural heterogeneity.  The conclusion is also buttressed by 
the potential utility of these properties in a sociological theory of law.193 
V.  CONCLUSION 
This article, adopting the perspective of macrosociology, has deemed law to be 
an institution of society and has accordingly considered law to be a component of a 
system.  If law is embedded in a system, the concepts and doctrines of law are 
shaped by conditions in that system and facilitate the operation of the system.  In this 
regard, the article contended that symbols are among the products of law, that 
symbols are responses to societal circumstances, and that symbols promote societal 
cohesion in the long run.  Specifically, the article examined concepts and doctrines 
of law that are concerned with the appearance to society that certain things are 
                                                          
LISTCOEF command for Stata and its STD option.  LONG & FREESE, supra note 172, at 320-21.  
However, while standardized coefficients in ordinary least-squares regression furnish a 
meaningful basis for ascertaining the relative magnitude of the relationship to the dependent 
variable of each independent variable, standardized coefficients in logistic regression seem to 
allow just a rough comparison of the independent variables, because statisticians have been 
unable to devise a standardization procedure for logistic regression that is free of limitations.  
See PAMPEL, supra note 187, at 32-34. 
190For table 4, the standardized coefficients were –0.42 for COLLEGERATE and +0.70 for 
FOREIGNPOP. 
191LONG & FREESE, supra note 172, at 147, 320-21. 
192For table 4, the inverse of the odds ratios is 1.605 for COLLEGERATE and 0.479 for 
FOREIGNPOP. 
193See HOSMER & LEMESHOW, supra note 166, at 184 (stressing the importance of 
developing useful theory). 
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present.  The article hypothesized that, through stimulus generalization, these 
concepts and doctrines become symbols when the things to which the concepts and 
doctrines refer are socially significant.  Because lawyering as an occupation is 
important in the United States and generates appearances to which the public is 
attentive,194 the appearance-of-impropriety standard in ethical rules for attorneys is 
among the concepts and doctrines of law that are symbolic. 
If macrosociology is correct in treating a society as a system—i.e., as a set of 
interacting, interdependent parts—symbolic concepts and doctrines are not random 
but, instead, are responses to identifiable aspects of the society in which they exist.  
Accordingly, an analysis was undertaken, with logistic regression, of state-level 
quantitative measures of four system-level properties—cultural heterogeneity, 
population concentration, social system rationality, and societal stability—to 
determine whether any of the four properties predicted the odds that the appearance-
of-impropriety standard for attorneys would be present in, rather than absent from, a 
state.  Two of the properties were found to have substantial predictive power.  
Specifically, higher cultural heterogeneity and lower social system rationality raised 
the odds that the standard was in use in a state.  For each state, the two properties 
were measured respectively by categories (ranges) of percentages of inhabitants who 
were born outside the United States and by categories (ranges) of percentages of 
adults who were enrolled in college. 
If social, demographic, and/or economic conditions outside the institution of law 
are responsible for concepts and doctrines inside the institution, law is not a self-
contained component of society that operates independently of other components.  
Instead, law as an institution is inextricably tied to the social system in which it 
exists, and the border between law and other institutions is porous.  Unfortunately, a 
judgment regarding the utility of the macrosociological approach to law that has 
been developed here will not be possible until an appreciable body of well-designed 
quantitative research that is pertinent to the approach has accumulated.195  However, 
the approach receives support from not just the instant study but from other studies 
as well.196  In finding that cultural heterogeneity and social system rationality were 
related to whether the appearance-of-impropriety standard for attorneys was 
                                                                
194For example, a survey conducted in 1995 of a sample of adults in the United States 
found that fully nine out of ten respondents had a definite opinion of attorneys; only 9% of the 
respondents either lacked an opinion of attorneys or declined to disclose their opinion.  Most 
respondents viewed attorneys unfavorably:  the perception that “lawyers use the legal system 
to protect the powerful and get rich” characterized 56% of the respondents, while the 
perception that “[l]awyers have an important role to play in holding wrongdoers accountable 
and helping the injured” existed among just 35% of the respondents.  Tarrance Group & 
Mellman, Lazarus & Lake accession no. 230752 (Jan. 13-15, 1995). available at LEXIS, 
News and Business, RPOLL File. 
195See Michael Heise, The Past, Present, and Future of Empirical Legal Scholarship:  
Judicial Decision Making and the New Empiricism, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 819, 824 (2002); 
Daniel Klerman, Statistical and Economic Approaches to Legal History, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 
1167, 1173-76 (2002). 
196Karen Smith Conway & Michael R. Butler, State Abortion Legislation as a Public 
Good —Before and After Roe v. Wade, 30 ECON. INQUIRY 609 (1992); Rick Geddes & Dean 
Lueck, The Gains from Self-Ownership and the Expansion of Women’s Rights, 92 AM. ECON. 
REV. 1079 (2002); Barnett, supra note 36, at 637-68. 
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maintained or discontinued by states, the instant study strengthens the thesis that law 
is a sociological phenomenon and that the concepts and doctrines of law can be 
understood only by placing them in their societal context. 
In order to explore more fully the implications of the study, I will assume that 
social system rationality and cultural heterogeneity operated as causes of state 
acceptance or rejection of the appearance-of-impropriety standard.  If these 
properties are adequately captured by their indicator variables, the juxtaposition of 
table 3 and table 5 suggests that the two properties, and the forces behind them, 
worked concurrently over time.  With regard to table 5, the top panel (panel A) 
shows, for each specified point in time, the percentage of the civilian non-
institutionalized population 16 years of age and older in the United States as a whole 
that was enrolled in college.  As measured by this percentage, social system 
rationality reached a plateau around 1980 after rising steadily for three decades.  The 
bottom panel (panel B) shows, for each specified year, the percentage of the total 
population of the United States that was born outside the United States.  As 
measured by this percentage, cultural heterogeneity declined moderately from the 
middle of the twentieth century until about 1970 and then increased substantially 
over the next three decades. 
All of the states in the study had adopted an appearance-of-impropriety standard 
for attorneys by 1980,197 and the states without the standard in 2005 had dropped it 
after 1980.  Given the shift from universal acceptance to partial acceptance of the 
standard, what conclusions can be drawn from bringing together the findings in table 
3 and the time-series data in table 5?  First, social system rationality, by increasing 
until about 1980, eroded support for the appearance-of-impropriety standard before 
the start of the period when an appreciable number of states discarded the standard, 
and after the period began, the inclination to end the standard was stronger in states 
that were relatively high in rationality.  Second, cultural heterogeneity, by growing 
during the period in which many states discontinued the standard, worked against the 
abandonment of the standard, and it promoted retention of the standard in direct 
proportion to the degree to which a state was heterogeneous. 
Third, the importance of cultural heterogeneity to continuation of the appearance-
of-impropriety standard was modestly greater than was the importance of social 
system rationality to the abandonment of the standard.  However, the effects of both 
properties were substantial; i.e., much if not most of the movement away from the 
standard after 1980 is evidently attributable to heightened social system rationality, 
and much if not most of the resistance to this movement is evidently attributable to 
increased cultural heterogeneity.  Notably, the relative magnitude of the impact of 
each property is roughly consistent with the relative number of states having and not 
having the appearance-of-impropriety standard:  greater cultural heterogeneity was 
associated somewhat more strongly with retention of the standard than greater social 
system rationality was associated with termination of the standard, and the number of 
states preserving the standard was modestly larger than the number of states 
eliminating it. 
In short, the retention of the appearance-of-impropriety standard for attorneys 
was not due to inertia, and the abandonment of the standard was not due to chance.  
Instead, two system-level properties were evidently major contributors to whether a 
                                                                
197See supra note 164 and accompanying text. 
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state accepted or rejected the standard during the time period covered by the study, 
and they helped to shape the decision on the standard by the courts and committees 
in the state that made the decision.  Because the appearance-of-impropriety standard 
for attorneys is symbolic, the two properties affected whether symbolism developed 
in law. 
 
Table 5.  College Enrollment and  
Foreign-Born Population: United States 
 
 
 
Before leaving the appearance-of-impropriety standard, a comment on 
investment advisers is in order.  Investment advisers, like attorneys, work in a 
government-regulated occupation:  an attorney must abide by requirements imposed 
by the judiciary of the state(s) in which the attorney is licensed to practice law; an 
investment adviser must be registered either with the Securities and Exchange 
                                                                
198Panel A shows, for each specified point in time, the percentage of the civilian 
noninstitutionalized population 16 years of age and older in the United States that was enrolled 
in college.  The percentages in Panel A were calculated from data in the following sources:  
DIGEST OF EDUCATION STATISTICS: 2003, supra note 136, at table 3; U.S. Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, Labor Force Statistics from the Current Population Survey.  Table A-1: 
Employment Status of the Civilian Population by Sex and Age (civilian noninstitutional 
population), available at http://www.bls.gov/webapps/legacy/cpsatab1.htm (last visited Nov. 
7, 2006).  The denominator for the calculation was the number of persons 16 years of age and 
older in the civilian noninstitutionalized population of the United States as of September of the 
year specified; the denominator for 1949-1950 was as of September 1949. 
199Panel B shows, for each specified year, the percentage of the total population of the 
United States that was born outside the United States.  The percentages in Panel B are from 
the following sources:  Gibson & Lennon, supra note 160; U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL 
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2004-2005, at table 42 (124th ed. 2004), available at 
http://www.census.gov/prod/www/abs/statab.html. 
 
 
Panel A198 
 
1949- 
1950 
 
Fall             
1959 
 
Fall 
1970 
 
Fall 
1980 
 
Fall 
1990 
 
Fall 
2000 
 
Percent of   
population age 
16+ enrolled in  
college 
 
2.6 3.1 6.2 7.2 7.3 7.2 
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Commission (“Commission”) or with a regulatory body of the state in which the 
adviser has its main office and business site, and must conform to applicable statutes 
and agency rules.200  In two cases, the Commission has expressed concern with 
appearances of impropriety in the conduct of investment advisers.201  Notably, 
however, such cases are not found after the early 1980s, precisely the point in time 
when the prevalence of the appearance-of-impropriety standard for attorneys began 
to decline in the United States.  It is unlikely to be coincidence that, since the early 
1980s, the Commission has not mentioned appearances of impropriety in the context 
of the duty owed by investment advisers to their clients.  Because the movement 
away from the appearance-of-impropriety standard was not confined to one 
occupation, logic suggests that the movement was not fortuitous.  Its explanation, 
instead, is presumably found in broadly operating forces. 
A final, but controversial, point should be made regarding the macrosociological 
approach to law on which this article rests.  Specifically, the approach offers the 
possibility of predicting, far in advance, the existence and emergence of law on 
socially significant topics.  To the extent that system-level properties determine the 
concepts and doctrines of law, information on the level of and change in pertinent 
properties can be used to forecast the law that a society will possess a decade or 
more in the future.  Predictions will not be uniformly correct, of course, but if the 
predictions are grounded on well-designed quantitative research, they will be 
accurate more often than they are flawed.  At the present time, however, rigorous 
quantitative research on the macrosociological aspects of law is scarce, and the 
existence and emergence of law on a wide variety of topics cannot be predicted with 
confidence. 
Why is prediction possible?  From a macrosociological perspective, particular 
personalities—no matter how charismatic or colorful they might be—are merely the 
vehicles through which the properties of society, and the large-scale forces that 
determine them, mold the fundamental content of law and generate fundamental 
shifts in this content.  The negligible importance of individuals in shaping law is 
evidenced, inter alia, by the similarity of concepts and doctrines of state law across 
the country,202 because the legislators, judges and government-agency officials 
promulgating law in one state are not the individuals who are the legislators, judges 
                                                                
20015 U.S.C. §§ 80b-3, 80b-3a (2000).  An investment adviser, even though registered with 
a state and not with the Commission, remains subject to the prohibition against fraud imposed 
by section 206 of the federal Investment Advisers Act and implementing rules adopted by the 
Commission.  Rules Implementing Amendments to the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 
Release No. IA-1601, 61 Fed. Reg. 68,480, 68,490 (Dec. 27, 1996); Investment Advisers Act 
Release No. IA-1633, 62 Fed. Reg. 28,112, 28,127, 28,128 (May 22, 1997). 
201In re Steadman Security Corp., Sec. & Exch. Comm’n Admin. Proc. File No. 3-3101, 
1974 SEC LEXIS 3639, at *103, *104 (Dec. 20, 1974); Report of Investigation in the Matter 
of Bull & Bear Management Corp., Investment Advisors Act Release No. 769, 1981 SEC 
LEXIS 931, at *8 (Aug. 7, 1981). 
202The commonality of law in the United States is illustrated by “model” statutes and 
rules.  The large number of, and wide range of subjects covered by, such statutes and rules is 
indicated by the contents of the “Model Acts & Uniform Laws” database in LEXIS (category 
ID 3002030).  While the statutes and rules as adopted undoubtedly differ in some ways 
between states, they necessarily possess an underlying similarity. 
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and government-agency officials promulgating law in another state.203  Societal-level 
properties, on the other hand, have broad effects and are likely to be at work 
throughout the United States (although their level/intensity may differ between 
states).  In addition, societal-level properties generally seem to develop at a gradual 
pace, not abruptly.  As a result, the ideas of law whose emergence, modification and 
abandonment are due to such properties and the forces behind them can in principle 
be anticipated well in advance.  In the study reported in the instant article, 
differences between states in the level/intensity of two particular system-level 
properties were found to predict use of the appearance-of-impropriety standard for 
attorneys a quarter of a century later. 
Given the potential predictability of law, let me revisit and assess a prediction I 
made in a publication in 1993.204  Specifically, I contended that, as the result of 
societal changes, law in the United States was likely “in the next two decades” 
explicitly to authorize physicians to assist in terminating the life of mentally 
competent individuals who requested assistance to end their suffering from 
physically stressful, incurable medical conditions that were expected to be fatal.205  
In the years since this prediction was made, the state of Oregon has adopted a statute 
allowing physician-assisted suicide under such conditions,206 and the United States 
Supreme Court has rejected an attempt by the executive branch of the federal 
government to prohibit physicians from using federally regulated medications to aid 
individuals in ending their lives in accordance with the requirements and procedures 
of a state statute.207  On the other hand, Oregon is the only U.S. state to date that has 
legalized physician-assisted suicide,208 and the Supreme Court has ruled that statutes 
barring physician-assisted suicide do not violate either the due process guarantee209 
or the equal protection guarantee210 of the national Constitution. 
Statutes on physician-assisted suicide are a type of symbolic law211 because 
physician-assisted suicide is a socially important topic and is unlikely, if legalized, to 
                                                                
203In the macrosociological approach I am advocating, the rate of replacement of—i.e., the 
rate of personnel turnover among—the individuals who are legislators, judges and 
government-agency officials may affect the timing of a basic change in law but does not 
determine whether the change occurs. 
204BARNETT, supra note 3, at ch. 6. 
205Id. at 140. 
206Death with Dignity Act, 13 OR. REV. STAT. § 127.800-.995 (2006).  The history of the 
Act is reviewed in OREGON DEP’T OF HUMAN SERVICES, EIGHTH ANNUAL REPORT ON 
OREGON’S DEATH WITH DIGNITY ACT 6-7 (March 9, 2006), available at 
http://www.oregon.gov/DHS/ph/pas/ar-index.shtml.  For a summary of the specific 
requirements of the Act, see id. at 7-8. 
207Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243 (2006). 
208The legal status of physician-assisted suicide worldwide is reviewed by Emily Wada, 
Note,  A Pretty Picture: The Margin of Appreciation and the Right to Assisted Suicide, 27 
LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 275 (2005). 
209Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997). 
210Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997). 
211See supra notes 62, 64-67 and accompanying text. 
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alter existing practices.  As to the social importance of the topic, more than three out 
of five adults in the United States reject the conclusion of the Supreme Court that 
statutory prohibitions on physician-assisted suicide are constitutional212 and thus 
believe that they possess an inherent right under certain conditions to end their lives 
with the aid of a physician.  At the same time, a majority of adults in the country as a 
whole consider the enactment of a statute legalizing physician-assisted suicide to be 
important.213  As to the impact of legalizing physician-assisted suicide, fewer than 4 
in 1000 deaths in Oregon have resulted from a lethal dose of medication obtained 
under the terms of the state statute allowing physician-assisted suicide.214  Therefore, 
like law generally that deals with social issues,215 law on physician-assisted suicide 
does not substantially alter a society but, instead, manifests the existing attributes of 
the society and serves as a symbol. 
My 1993 prediction that physician-assisted suicide would be explicitly and 
widely legalized in the United States over the course of the following two decades 
will almost certainly prove wrong in terms of timing.  Formal approval of the 
practice continues to be likely—e.g., through legislation and/or written 
interpretations of existing statutes by state attorneys general—but it will involve a 
much longer period of time than I anticipated.  Probably the main cause of the delay 
is that physician-aided suicide has been largely legalized de facto.  That is, a 
substantial number of physicians in the United States evidently help terminally ill 
patients to end their lives,216 and even though the practice is not authorized by 
statute, physicians are rarely prosecuted for it.217  Because the practice has been 
legalized de facto, there is less pressure on society to revise existing statutes that ban 
the practice. 
Nonetheless, physician-assisted suicide is likely to be expressly and widely 
authorized by state law in the future.  Legalization de jure of physician-assisted 
suicide can be expected because of social values—Americans accept the practice and 
want statutes that allow it.  For example, in national sample surveys of adults in the 
United States conducted from 1994 to 2005, no less than three out of five 
respondents preferred that their state adopt a statute allowing physician-aided suicide 
                                                                
212Louis Harris & Assoc. accession no. 282134 (July 9-14, 1997), available at LEXIS, 
News and Business, RPOLL File; Harris Interactive accession no. 395078 (Dec. 14-19, 2001), 
available at LEXIS, News and Business, RPOLL File. 
213International Communications Research accession no. 394148 (April 25-May 20, 2001), 
available at LEXIS, News and Business, RPOLL File.  The findings of this survey are 
presented infra note 220 and its accompanying text. 
214OREGON DEP’T OF HUMAN SERVICES, supra note 206, at 21. 
215BARNETT, supra note 3, at 162. 
216Timothy E. Quill, Risk Taking by Physicians in Legally Gray Areas, 57 ALB. L. REV. 
693, 699 (1994); Brief for American College of Legal Medicine as Amicus Curiae, Vacco v. 
Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997) (No. 95-1858) and Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 
(1997) (No. 96-110), 1996 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 674, at *44 (Nov. 12, 1996). 
217Stephen J. Ziegler, Physician-Assisted Suicide and Criminal Prosecution: Are 
Physicians at Risk?, 33 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 349, 355 (2005) (noting that “the number of 
physicians prosecuted for participating in [physician-assisted suicide] is virtually non-
existent.”). 
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with conditions and requirements comparable to those in the Oregon act.218  Further, 
legalization of physician-aided suicide is an issue that seems to be of more than 
minimal concern to most Americans.  In a sample survey of adults in the United 
States conducted during 2001, almost three out of five respondents believed that 
passage “within the next year” of a federal statute allowing physician-assisted 
suicide219 in cases of terminal illness was “important,” “very important,” or 
“extremely important,” while somewhat less than two out of five respondents 
thought such a statute either was “not important” or should not be adopted.220  
Notably, broad support for the legalization of physician assistance to end the lives of 
terminally ill patients is not recent—legalization has been favored by a majority of 
Americans since the mid-1980s.221  Over time, furthermore, support for legalization 
will become stronger in the United States as the older generation, which is less 
inclined than the younger generation to endorse legalization, is removed from the 
population by death.222  Law formally permitting physician-assisted suicide can thus 
be expected to emerge in most if not all states in the future. 
Why are social values supportive of a change in law on this topic?  Probably the 
most important factor in current social values is social system rationality.  
Rationality seems to have reached the point where most participants in U.S. society 
want the option of selecting the manner and timing of their deaths from a 
progressive, terminal illness.223  As the United States has added to its stock of 
knowledge, reason and individualism have increased.224  The result has been an 
                                                                
218Louis Harris & Assoc. accession no. 229233 (1994), available at LEXIS, News and 
Business, RPOLL File; Louis Harris & Assoc. accession no. 282136 (July 9-July 14, 1997), 
available at LEXIS, News and Business, RPOLL File; Harris Interactive accession no. 395079 
(Dec. 14-19, 2001), available at LEXIS, News and Business, RPOLL File; Harris Interactive 
accession no. 1623473 (Apr. 5-10, 2005), available at LEXIS, News and Business, RPOLL 
File. 
219Under current U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence, a federal statute that authorizes 
physician-assisted suicide in contravention of state law probably exceeds the power of 
Congress under the Commerce Clause.  See Brian Boyle, Comment, The Oregon Death with 
Dignity Act: A Successful Model or a Legal Anomaly Vulnerable to Attack?, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 
1387, 1400-06 (2004). 
220International Communications Research accession no. 394148 (Apr. 25-May 20, 2001), 
available at LEXIS, News and Business, RPOLL File.  The alternatives “important,” “very 
important” and “extremely important” were chosen by 21%, 23%, and 13% of the 
respondents, respectively. 
221O. D. Duncan & L. F. Parmelee, Trends in Public Approval of Euthanasia and Suicide 
in the US, 1947-2003, 32 J. MED. ETHICS 266, 267 (2006). 
222Id. at 269; BARNETT, supra note 3, at 145-46, 148-52. 
223This contention is supported by the education gradient in the use of physician-assisted 
suicide in Oregon:  the rate of physician-assisted suicide in the state rises rapidly with level of 
schooling completed.  OREGON DEP’T OF HUMAN SERVICES, supra note 206, at 21. 
224The level of knowledge in a society is manifested in the efficiency and effectiveness of 
its technology.  Change in the level of knowledge in the United States, therefore, can be 
measured by the annual number of patents issued for inventions.  Barnett, supra note 36, at 
628-31. 
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erosion of public acceptance of rules that deny personal choice.  Heightened social 
system rationality was found to be related to the abandonment by states of the 
appearance-of-impropriety standard for attorneys, and it is likely to contribute as 
well to the elimination of law that prohibits individuals with a terminal illness from 
opting for physician assistance to end their lives.225 
                                                          
The growth of knowledge promoted reason and individualism through a two-step process.  
In the first step, advances in technology raised enrollments in primary and secondary schools.  
Richard Rubinson & John Ralph, Technical Change and the Expansion of Schooling in the 
United States, 1890-1970, 57 SOC. EDUC. 134 (1984).  The number of students was boosted by 
the higher personal income that schooling generates.  Kathryn Wilson, The Determinants of 
Educational Attainment: Modeling and Estimating the Human Capital Model and Education 
Production Functions, 67 S. ECON. J. 518, 545 (2001).  In the second step, higher personal 
income increased individualism.  Ron Lesthaeghe, A Century of Demographic and Cultural 
Change in Western Europe:  An Exploration of Underlying Dimensions, 9 POPULATION & 
DEV. REV. 411, 429-30 (1983).  By definition, individualism is characterized by rationality:  
individualism entails “a mode of life in which the individual . . . follows out his own ideas; 
free and independent individual . . . thought.”  7 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 880 (2nd ed. 
1989). 
225If increased social system rationality will be a major force behind the de jure 
legalization of physician-assisted suicide, such legalization will in general occur the earliest in 
states characterized by the highest level of rationality.  The fifteen states that were in the 
highest category of COLLEGERATE in table 2, and by this measure were highest in social system 
rationality, were (in alphabetical order) Arizona, California, Colorado, Delaware, Illinois, 
Kansas, Massachusetts, Michigan, Nebraska, New York, Oregon, Rhode Island, Utah, 
Vermont, and Wisconsin. 
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